Doctor, I\u27m Pregnant and Fifteen--I Can\u27t Tell My Parents--Please Help Me:  Minor Consent, Reproductive Rights, and Ethical Principles for Physicians by Haas, Dean J.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 86 Number 1 Article 2 
1-1-2010 
"Doctor, I'm Pregnant and Fifteen--I Can't Tell My Parents--Please 
Help Me:" Minor Consent, Reproductive Rights, and Ethical 
Principles for Physicians 
Dean J. Haas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Haas, Dean J. (2010) ""Doctor, I'm Pregnant and Fifteen--I Can't Tell My Parents--Please Help Me:" Minor 
Consent, Reproductive Rights, and Ethical Principles for Physicians," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 86 : 
No. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol86/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
      
 
“DOCTOR, I’M PREGNANT AND FIFTEEN— 
I CAN’T TELL MY PARENTS—PLEASE HELP ME”: 
MINOR CONSENT, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, 
AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR PHYSICIANS 




The parent-child bond underpins human society, and parents guard 
their children’s lives and health as their own.  Basic legal principles require 
parents to provide care necessary for their minor child’s physical, mental, 
and emotional health, and parental consent is generally required to treat 
minor patients.  But the case of reproductive health—pregnancy and what 
to do about it—presents difficult issues; adolescents consider themselves 
young adults, not children, and have an expectation of a certain level of 
privacy in this most sensitive of health concerns.  Medical providers face a 
quandary:  respect a minor’s request to privacy, or notify the parents their 
young daughter is pregnant?  The 2009 North Dakota Legislature addressed 
the issue, passing Senate Bill 2394—codified at N.D.C.C. § 14-10-19.  The 
statute, entitled “Minor’s consent for prenatal care and other pregnancy care 
services,” allows a health care provider to provide pregnancy testing and 
pain management related to pregnancy to a minor without the consent of a 
parent or guardian.  However, the care based on the minor’s own consent is 
limited to prenatal care in the first trimester of pregnancy, and to a single 
prenatal care visit in the second or third trimester of pregnancy without the 
consent of a parent or guardian.  The statute also requires medical providers 
to encourage the pregnant minor to involve her parents.  The statute serves 
two policy goals.  First, if a minor who is hesitant to involve her parents at 
the beginning of her pregnancy is assured of confidentiality she will feel 
able to seek health care earlier in the pregnancy which improves pregnancy 
outcomes and reduces the incidence of complications.  Second, the statute 
requires medical providers to discuss with their young patients the general 
benefit of parental involvement, soliciting the minor’s reasons for not 
involving her parents and correcting misconceptions that may be motivating 
her objections, and may reduce the incidence of abortion.  This statute does 
not authorize a minor to consent to abortion or otherwise supersede the 
requirements of chapter 14-02.1.  The statute has not changed the status 
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quo, and has not answered the significant constitutional and ethical princi-
ples relating to a minor female’s right to make such profound decisions 
regarding her reproductive life.  The statute does not eliminate parental 
involvement, but expands the circumstances under which a medical 
provider may provide care based on minor consent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose a fifteen-year-old comes to your office seeking medical atten-
tion because she fears she is pregnant.  She may be afraid to tell her parents, 
confused about what her future holds, and in need of your care, both 
physically and emotionally.  You may have a child her age, and your empa-
thy could be easily kindled.  Your professional instincts take over; you 
undertake an examination, counsel and console, and ascertain the young 
woman’s initial intentions.  You hope the parents of the young woman are 
stable adults who can be informed and counted on to support their daughter, 
and you discuss this with your patient.  She may be reluctant; she may have 
real—or simply imagined—reasons to refuse to involve her parents.  As a 
physician, you understand you are ethically bound to confidentiality, an 
essential element in forming and fostering the physician-patient bond1—a 
sacrosanct bond in our society, unique because physicians help safeguard 
the most elemental human need:  our very health and well-being.  And, as 
you inform her about the medically-indicated courses of action, you and 
your young patient begin to plan the treatment regimen.  At this point, you 
have agreed to one of the most challenging relationships a physician might 
undertake:  you have in your charge a girl who, in the absence of parental 
support, seeks your support.  You hope this situation can be rectified, but 
that might not be possible.  You are in the middle of a dilemma:  How do 
you balance the competing interests?  Do parents not have rights, too?  How 
do you ensure that you comply with the law?  What does your conscience 
tell you to do, if your own reaction to the young woman’s plan is not in 
accord with your principles? 
 
*Dean J. Haas is in private practice with the Bismarck, North Dakota, law firm Larson 
Latham Huettl.  He has also served as General Counsel to the North Dakota Medical Association 
and as an Assistant Attorney General for the North Dakota Department of Health and North 
Dakota Worker’s Compensation Insurance Fund.  He received a J.D. with distinction from the 
University of North Dakota in 1980, and an L.L.M. in Health Law with honors from the 
University of Houston in 2000.  The author thanks the North Dakota Medical Association for 
providing the time and resources to complete this article. 
1. “[P]hysicians are not fungible as to their relationships with patients,” Baptist Health v. 
Murphy, 226 S.W.3d 800, 813 (Ark. 2006), because “[s]trong patient-physician relationships are 
the underpinning of good medicine, and . . . patients who have long term relationships with their 
doctors have better outcomes.” Murphy v. Baptist Health, No. CV 2004-2002 (Ark. Cir. Ct., 
Pulaski Cnty., 13th Div., Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/ 
mm/395/order-for-permanent-injunction.pdf.  President Barack Obama emphasized the centrality 
of physicians to health care, noting in his extemporaneous remarks during his speech to the 
American Medical Association on June 15, 2009, “I need your help, doctors[.] . . .   To most 
Americans, you are the health care system.  We just do what you tell us to do.” President Obama 
Brings His Health System Reform Proposals to U.S. Physicians, TEXAS MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 
(Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=7809. 
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Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 2394 by North Dakota’s 2009 
Legislative Assembly, codified at North Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.) 
section 14-10-19,2 a physician would have faced a direct quandary:  the 
general parental consent requirement would apply, but ethical rules pointed 
toward maintaining confidentiality.  The new statute provides some cover, 
authorizing treatment based on minor consent during the first trimester, 
though limiting treatment based on minor consent to one visit during the 
second and third trimesters.3  In addition to discussing the issues that arise 
from the legislature’s enactment of Senate Bill 2394, this article addresses a 
number of over arching issues involving minors’ reproductive rights and 
ethical principles that govern a physician’s conduct in the context of 
reproductive health. 
 
2. The statute, entitled “Minor’s consent for prenatal care and other pregnancy care 
services,” provides as follows: 
1. a. A physician or other health care provider may provide pregnancy testing and 
pain management related to pregnancy to a minor without the consent of a parent 
or guardian. 
b. A physician or other health care provider may provide prenatal care to a 
pregnant minor in the first trimester of pregnancy or may provide a single 
prenatal care visit in the second or third trimester of pregnancy without the 
consent of a parent or guardian. 
c. A physician or other health care provider may provide prenatal care beyond 
the first trimester of pregnancy or in addition to the single prenatal care visit in 
the second or third trimester if, after a good-faith effort, the physician or other 
health care provider is unable to contact the minor’s parent or guardian. 
d. The costs incurred by the physician or other health care provider for 
performing services under this section may not be submitted to a third-party 
payer without the consent of the minor’s parent or guardian. 
e. This section does not authorize a minor to consent to abortion or otherwise 
supersede the requirements of chapter 14-02.1. 
2. If a minor requests confidential services pursuant to subsection 1, the physician or 
other health care professional shall encourage the minor to involve her parents or 
guardian.  Notwithstanding subsection 1, a physician or other health care professional 
or a health care facility may not be compelled against their best judgment to treat a 
minor based on the minor’s own consent. 
3. A physician or other health care professional who, pursuant to subsection 1, pro-
vides pregnancy care services to a minor may inform the parent or guardian of the 
minor of any pregnancy care services given or needed if the physician or other health 
care professional discusses with the minor the reasons for informing the parent or 
guardian prior to the disclosure and, in the judgment of the physician or other health 
care professional: 
a. Failure to inform the parent or guardian would seriously jeopardize the health 
of the minor or her unborn child; 
b. Surgery or hospitalization is needed; or 
c. Informing the parent or guardian would benefit the health of the minor or her 
unborn child. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-19 (2009). 
3. Id. § 14-10-19(1)(b). 
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II. INFORMED CONSENT FOR MINORS UNDER CURRENT 
NORTH DAKOTA LAW 
While the general contours under which a physician may provide 
medical care to a minor without parental consent are relatively clear, the 
legislature has struggled for years with the controversial issue regarding a 
minor’s right to confidentiality.  After several failed efforts to pass legis-
lation,4 Senate Bill 2394 is the 2009 legislature’s resolution, however 
imperfect, of the minor consent to medical care issue.  In brief, the statute 
expands the circumstances under which pregnancy-related health care may 
be provided based on minor consent.5  Although the legislation represents a 
step forward, it simultaneously creates problems.  The statute attempts to 
manage a physician’s practice by limiting a minor’s right to consent to 
treatment to one prenatal visit during the second and third trimesters,6 and 
the statute prohibits billing the minor’s insurer if parental consent is not 
obtained.7  This article makes practical suggestions for physicians to resolve 
the problems created by the new statute. 
It is a basic principle that parents are required to provide the care and 
control necessary for their minor8 child’s physical, mental, and emotional 
health.9  But other than N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19, there is no clear and 
unambiguous language in North Dakota statutes or case law concerning the 
circumstances under which minors may consent to their own medical 
treatment without parental consent.  Arguably, N.D.C.C. section 23-12-13 
generally requires parental consent for minor health care treatment.10  
 
4. See generally S.B. 2181, 60th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2007); S.B. 2308, 59th Leg. Assemb. 
(N.D. 2005).  Previous bills were introduced in the North Dakota Legislative Assembly in 2005 
and 2007, as Senate Bill 2308 and Senate Bill 2181, respectively.  S.B. 2181, supra; S.B. 2308, 
supra.  Though differing in detail, both bills would have authorized minors to consent to care 
related to pregnancy.  S.B. 2181, supra; S.B. 2308, supra.  While the legislation passed easily in 
the state Senate in both years, the House handily defeated the 2005 bill, and the 2007 version died 
in a tie vote in the House, 46-46. See S.B. 2181, supra; S.B. 2308, supra. 
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-19 (2009). 
6. Id. § 14-10-19(1)(b) (2009). 
7. Id. § 14-10-19(1)(d). 
8. The N.D.C.C. defines a minor as any person under the age of eighteen. Id. § 14-10-01. 
9. Id. § 14-09-22 (providing for a class C felony for failure to provide “proper parental care 
or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the 
child’s physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals.”).  There is also general recognition that 
minors are “members of a special class of citizens who may require additional legal protection.” 
E.g., Olson v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp. Dir., 523 N.W.2d 258, 260 (N.D. 1994). 
10. See § 23-12-13.  The N.D.C.C. provides: 
1. Informed consent for health care for a minor patient or a patient who is determined 
by a physician to be an incapacitated person, as defined in subsection 2 of section 
30.1-26-01, and unable to consent may be obtained from a person authorized to 
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Under section 23-12-13, North Dakota is consistent with the general 
common law rule that a physician is liable for treating a minor without the 
consent of the minor’s parents, except in emergency cases in which it was 
impractical to obtain parental consent, or when any delay would unduly 
 
consent on behalf of the patient.  Persons in the following classes and in the following 
order of priority may provide informed consent to health care on behalf of the patient: 
a. The individual, if any, to whom the patient has given a durable power of 
attorney that encompasses the authority to make health care decisions, unless a 
court of competent jurisdiction specifically authorizes a guardian to make 
medical decisions for the incapacitated person; 
b. The appointed guardian or custodian of the patient, if any; 
c. The patient’s spouse who has maintained significant contacts with the 
incapacitated person; 
d. Children of the patient who are at least eighteen years of age and who have 
maintained significant contacts with the incapacitated person; 
e. Parents of the patient, including a stepparent who has maintained significant 
contacts with the incapacitated person; 
f. Adult brothers and sisters of the patient who have maintained significant 
contacts with the incapacitated person; 
g. Grandparents of the patient who have maintained significant contacts with the 
incapacitated person; 
h. Grandchildren of the patient who are at least eighteen years of age and who 
have maintained significant contacts with the incapacitated person; or 
i. A close relative or friend of the patient who is at least eighteen years of age 
and who has maintained significant contacts with the incapacitated person. 
2. A physician seeking informed consent for proposed health care for a minor patient 
or a patient who is an incapacitated person and is unable to consent must make 
reasonable efforts to locate and secure authorization for the health care from a com-
petent person in the first or succeeding class identified in subsection 1.  If the physi-
cian is unable to locate such person, authorization may be given by any person in the 
next class in the order of descending priority.  A person identified in subsection 1 may 
not provide informed consent to health care if a person of higher priority has refused 
to give such authorization. 
3. Before any person authorized to provide informed consent pursuant to this section 
exercises that authority, the person must first determine in good faith that the patient, 
if not incapacitated, would consent to the proposed health care.  If such a determina-
tion cannot be made, the decision to consent to the proposed health care may be made 
only after determining that the proposed health care is in the patient’s best interests. 
4. No person authorized to provide informed consent pursuant to this section may pro-
vide consent for sterilization, abortion, or psychosurgery or for admission to a state 
mental health facility for a period of more than forty-five days without a mental health 
proceeding or other court order. 
5. If a patient who is determined by a physician to be an incapacitated person, or a 
person interested in the patient’s welfare, objects to a determination of incapacity 
made pursuant to this section, a court hearing pursuant to chapter 30.1-28 must be held 
to determine the issue of incapacity. 
Id. § 23-12-13.  This statute stems from the 1991 House Bill 1296, which, as introduced, would 
have addressed consent to medical treatment only in respect to incapacitated persons.  H.B. 1296, 
52d Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 1991).  The language adding minors to the consent bill appears to have 
been an afterthought, resulting from a question posed from representatives of the North Dakota 
Medical Association to the 1991 Senate Human Services and Veteran Affairs Committee as to 
whether minors were included in the definition of incapacitated persons.  Subsequent amendments 
were made to the bill to clarify this question. See Hearing on H.B. 1296 Before the S. Human 
Servs. & Veterans Affairs Comm., 52d Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 1991). 
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endanger the patient’s health and life.11  A second common exception to the 
parental consent requirement exists for emancipated or mature minors.12 
Some question whether the legislature improved the law by enacting 
N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19, arguing that medical providers could advantage 
themselves of the vagueness of N.D.C.C. section 23-12-13, which does not 
necessarily require parental consent to such prenatal care.13  Admittedly, 
North Dakota’s general “minor consent statute” is not a model of clarity, 
providing that “[i]nformed consent for health care for a minor patient . . . 
may be obtained from a [third] person . . . .”14  Use of the word “may” 
indicates the statute does not specifically require informed consent from a 
third person for a minor patient.  And, while the statute requires a physician 
to make “reasonable efforts” to secure consent, the obligation only applies 
when the physician “seek[s] informed consent.”15  Although legislative 
history is not germane unless the statute is deemed ambiguous,16 N.D.C.C. 
section 23-12-13 seems ambiguous, and the legislative history suggests that 
it was intended for North Dakota to follow the general rule that parental 
 
11. § 23-12-13.  The N.D.C.C. also provides a “minor may contract for and receive 
emergency examination, care, or treatment in a life threatening situation without the . . . consent of 
the minor’s parent or guardian.” Id. § 14-10-17.1.  See MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING 
THE CHILD CLIENT § 3.02(2)(c)(i) (2008); FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT 
§ 5.01(B)(1)-(2) (4th ed. 2007); Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Medical Practitioner’s Liability 
for Treatment Given Child Without Parent’s Consent, 67 A.L.R.4th 511, 530-34 (1989).  Of 
course, the health emergency must be the minor’s—for example, a minor cannot consent to 
providing blood in an emergency situation for another patient who requires a blood donor. 
Veilleux, supra, § 3, at 523-24. 
12. Veilleux, supra note 12, at 530-34.  North Dakota appears to recognize the common law 
emancipated minor exception in N.D.C.C. section 14-09-20, which  provides that “[t]he authority 
of a parent ceases” if a court appoints a guardian, if the child marries, or if the child reaches age 
eighteen. § 14-09-20.  Thus, the marriage of a minor would emancipate the minor and presumably 
constitute an exception to the parental consent requirement for medical care. See id.  North Dakota 
also recognizes a court should consider the minor’s maturity in determining whether to bypass 
parental consent requirements in the case of abortion, and state law provides that a married minor 
may consent on her own behalf. Id. § 14-02.1-03.1(1)(b), (5).  That some minors achieve maturity 
at an earlier age than others is a truism recognized by the courts. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 440 (1983) (noting a state cannot presume the immaturity of 
female minors under the age of fifteen). 
13. See § 23-12-13. 
14. Id. § 23-12-13(1) (emphasis added). 
15. Id. § 23-12-13(2). 
16. In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of V.J.V.N., 2008 ND 106, ¶ 10, 750 N.W.2d 
462, 465.  The North Dakota Supreme Court noted: 
If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the letter of the statute cannot be 
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit, because the Legislature’s intent is 
presumed clear from the face of the statute.  N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05.  If statutory language 
is ambiguous, a court may resort to extrinsic aids, including legislative history, to 
interpret the statute.  N.D.C.C. § 1-02-39. 
Id. (quoting In re Guardianship/Conservatorship of Van Sickle, 2005 ND 69, ¶ 18, 694 N.W.2d 
212, 219). 
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consent is required.17  Thus, the limited exception to the parental consent 
requirement in the 2009 legislation creating N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19 is 
arguably an improvement in the ambiguity of existing law. 
Some health care providers also contend the new statute is unneces-
sary, arguing minors have a constitutional right to privacy that trumps 
statutes requiring parental consent in matters relating to procreation—for 
example, abortion and contraceptives.  The constitutional right to privacy 
issue exists, however, regardless of whether the legislature enacted Senate 
Bill 2394.18 
What is informed consent?  The medical profession has established a 
strong code of ethics concerning many of the topics addressed in this 
article.  The American Medical Association (AMA) Current Opinion E-8.08 
addresses informed consent, providing “[t]he patient’s right of self-decision 
can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough informa-
tion to enable an informed choice . . . .  The physician’s obligation is to 
present the medical facts accurately to the patient . . . and to make recom-
mendations for management in accordance with good medical practice.”19  
The ethical opinions recognize that in the case of minors, the information is 
generally provided to the parents.20 
Although the AMA opinions provide guidance, North Dakota physi-
cians must comply with the state’s informed consent law to avoid liability.  
The doctrine of informed consent places a duty on “a physician to disclose 
sufficient information to permit a patient to make an informed and intelli-
gent decision on whether to submit to a proposed course of treatment or 
surgical procedure.”21  So, an informed consent action stands separate from 
 
17. See H.B. 1296, supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
18. See discussion infra Part VII. 
19. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 
CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS § 8.08, at 245-46 (Am. Med. Ass’n 2008-2009 ed. 
2008) [hereinafter AMA CURRENT OPINION], available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/ 
upload/mm/Code_of_Med_Eth/toc.html. 
20. Id. §§ 5.055, 8.08, at 166-67, 245-46. 
21. Flatt v. Kantak, 2004 ND 173, ¶ 6, 687 N.W.2d 208, 211.  In Winkjer v. Herr, the court 
noted that while a majority of courts have related a physician’s duty of disclosure to a subjective 
standard of the custom of physicians practicing in the community, a growing number of juris-
dictions have adopted an objective standard for measuring the performance of a physician’s duty 
of disclosure based on conduct that is reasonable under the circumstances. 277 N.W.2d 579, 587 
(N.D. 1979).  In other words, while some jurisdictions measure materiality based on what infor-
mation a “reasonable doctor” would provide, “[o]thers refuse to cede to the medical profession the 
decision of what risks ought to be disclosed.  Emphasizing that the heart of an informed consent 
right is patient autonomy, they opt for a ‘reasonable patient’ standard to determine materiality.” 
Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twercki, Uncertainty and Informed Choice:  Unmasking 
Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 271 (2005).  In Jaskoviak v. Gruver, the court did not explicitly 
adopt either the subjective or objective standard of disclosure, but rather discussed common 
ground under both standards: 
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a claim that the physician was negligent in recommending or performing 
therapy.22  An informed consent action assumes no operational negligence 
but instead focuses on the physician’s failure to deliver to the patient 
information about “available choices for treatment and the material and 
known risks involved with each treatment.”23  An assessment of the 
materiality of risk involves:  “(1) an examination of the existence and 
nature of the risk and the probability of its occurrence; and (2) a 
determination by the trier of fact of whether the risk is the type of harm 
which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding on medical 
treatment.”24  Materiality is a “function of the severity of the potential 
injury and of the likelihood it will occur.”25  Of particular interest to 
physicians may be special rules that govern informed consent involving 
prescription drugs—the so-called learned intermediary doctrine, which 
places on the physician the duty to provide the patient with drug 
information, absolving the manufacturer of liability.26  Of course, the duty 
to warn and the obligation to provide information also apply when caring 
for minors, though the consent obtained is frequently that of the parent.  
The informed consent doctrine reappears in the discussion about 
“conscience clauses.”27 
 
In acquiring a patient’s informed consent to a medical procedure, a physician should 
disclose a number of things:  It is sometimes said that the physician should disclose 
the diagnosis, the general nature of the contemplated procedure, the material risks 
involved in the procedure, the probability of success associated with the procedure, the 
prognosis if the procedure is not carried out, and the existence and risks of any 
alternatives to the procedure. 
2002 ND 1, ¶¶ 17-19, 638 N.W.2d 1, 8-9 (citations omitted). 
22. Berger & Twercki, supra note 22, at 270. 
23. Flatt, ¶¶ 6-8, 687 N.W.2d at 211-12. 
24. Gruver, ¶¶ 17-19. 
25. Flatt, ¶¶ 6-8.  In sum, “a physician is not required to inform a patient of risks that are so 
remote as to be negligible even where the consequences may be severe, and is not required to 
inform the patient of a very minor consequence even though the probability is high.” Id. ¶ 8. 
26. Terence C. Green, Licking, Sticking, Counting, and Pouring—Is That All Pharmacists 
Do?, McKee v. American Home Products, Corp., 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1991).  
Traditionally, the law’s attempt to disclose to patients the hazards of prescription drugs has 
operated through a two-pronged duty:  first, the manufacturer has a duty to inform the physician 
about the uses and hazards of its drug; second, the physician has a duty to relate to each of her 
patients the dangers of using that prescription drug. Id.  While a thorough discussion of the 
learned intermediary doctrine is outside the scope of this article, the doctrine, adopted in a 
majority of jurisdictions, largely absolves drug makers and pharmacies from having a duty to warn 
customers by recognizing that prescribing physicians bear the primary responsibility to warn 
patient-consumers of drug interactions and side-effects. See, e.g., Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 
S.W.3d 758, 762 (Ky. 2004) (noting the doctrine is recognized by the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability in section 6(d)).  At least thirty-four states have adopted the learned 
intermediary doctrine. Id. at 767. 
27. See discussion infra Part VI. 
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III. ADDITIONAL CARE BASED ON MINOR CONSENT 
The North Dakota Legislative Assembly’s enactment of N.D.C.C. 
section 14-10-19 expands the circumstances under which pregnancy-related 
health care may be provided based on minor consent, granting a minor the 
right to consent to “pregnancy testing and pain management” without pa-
rental consent.28  Despite the clear delineation of the treatments covered—
pregnancy testing, pain management, and prenatal care—to ensure there can 
be no misunderstanding, the legislature further specified the section “does 
not authorize a minor to consent to abortion or otherwise supersede the 
requirements of chapter 14-02.1.”29  The statute requires physicians and 
other health care providers to encourage a pregnant minor to involve her 
parents.30  By requiring that this discussion between physician and patient 
take place in the case of prenatal care, the legislation arguably improves 
upon the current statutory scheme.  Further improvements are possible; 
section 2 of the legislation provides for an interim study of the issue, and 
the Legislative Council has placed the item on its list of matters “prioritized 
for study.”31 
N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19 follows the lead of at least thirty-five other 
states in providing statutory authority for a physician or other health care 
professional to rely on the consent of a minor for pregnancy-related health 
care.  The statute thus serves two laudable policy goals.  First, if a minor 
who is hesitant to involve her parents at the beginning of her pregnancy is 
assured of confidentiality, she will feel able to seek health care earlier in the 
pregnancy to improve pregnancy outcomes, as well as potentially limit the 
risks and eliminate the cost of additional treatment for complications.  
Second, by requiring a physician-patient discussion regarding the general 
benefit of parental involvement—for example, soliciting the minor’s 
reasons for not involving her parents and correcting misconceptions that 
may be motivating her objections—N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19 might 
reduce the incidence of abortion.32 
 
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-19(1)(a) (2009). 
29. Id. § 14-10-19(1)(e). 
30. Id. § 14-10-19(2).  The statute uses the words “shall encourage.” Id.  Use of the word 
“shall” ordinarily means the duty is mandatory. See Timm v. Schoenwald, 400 N.W.2d 260, 263 
(N.D. 1987).  See also infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (noting the AMA Ethics Opinions 
similarly recognize it is generally beneficial to the minor patient to involve the parents). 
31. N.D. Legislative Council, Study Directives and Assignments Made by the Legislative 
Council for the 2009-10 Interim 2 (March 2, 2010), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/ 
assembly/61-2009/docs/pdf/citation.pdf. 
32. Statistics from the North Dakota Department of Health indicate that 194 children were 
born to a minor parent in 2007, compared to 182 in 2005.  In that same year, fifty-two minors 
aborted their unborn children, compared to thirty-six minors who aborted their unborn children in 
2005.  
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A. THE CARE LIMITATION CREATES POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
As noted, the new minor consent statute authorizes provision of 
“prenatal care” without parental consent in the first trimester, “or . . . a 
single prenatal care visit in the second or third trimester.”33  Additional care 
beyond this may be provided without parental consent only if the health 
care provider is unable to locate the minor’s parent or guardian, despite a 
“good-faith effort” to do so.34  This limitation on the physician’s ability to 
provide a minor with pregnancy-related health care based on the minor’s 
own consent raises the first potential problem:  affording patient confiden-
tiality and avoiding abandonment of the patient.  One practical solution to 
the legislature’s inapt involvement in the physician-patient relationship—
limiting the physician’s ability to provide care based on minor consent—is 
to have in place a referral system so the care of the minor patient objecting 
to disclosure may be readily transferred to another physician.  Although the 
referral system might fracture medical care by requiring a minor to change 
physician mid-stream, some medical care is preferable to no care, and a 
referral in compliance with statutory treatment limitations based on minor 
consent meets the physician’s ethical duties and avoids patient 
abandonment.35 
What is the tort of abandonment?  Once a professional relationship has 
been created, a physician is legally required to provide the patient treatment 
unless or until the relationship is properly terminated; improper termination 
constitutes the tort of abandonment and the risk of malpractice liability for 
consequential harm.36  While physicians have an absolute right—they need 
not provide a reason—to terminate care and treatment of a patient,37 
 
33. Id. § 14-10-19(1)(b). 
34. Id. § 14-10-19(1)(c). 
35. See AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, § 8.115, at 261.  AMA Current Opinion E-
8.115, Termination of the Physician-Patient Relationship, formerly included Opinion E-8.11, 
Neglect of Patients. See id.  Opinion E-8.115 states, “Physicians have an obligation to support 
continuity of care for their patients.” Id.  Further, Opinion E-10.01, Fundamental Elements of the 
Physician-Patient Relationship, provides: 
The patient has the right to continuity of health care.  The physician has an obligation 
to cooperate in the coordination of medically indicated care with other health pro-
viders treating the patient.  The physician may not discontinue treatment of a patient as 
long as further treatment is medically indicated, without giving the patient reasonable 
assistance and sufficient opportunity to make alternative arrangements for care. 
Id. § 10.01. 
36. Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211-12 (Utah 1937) (holding the failure to satisfy the duty 
to notify the patient when the physician terminates the relationship can result in abandonment 
liability if the patient suffers an injury as a result of the termination). 
37. See, e.g., Grant v. Douglas Women’s Clinic, P.C., 580 S.E.2d 532, 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2003).  The court held that although the physician may unilaterally withdraw from treating a 
patient, the physician must provide reasonable notice of withdrawal to enable the patient to obtain 
substitute care if the patient desires. Id.  The court stated whether the physician’s chart notation 
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physicians should be prepared for the courts to examine the manner in 
which that relationship was terminated. 
Once the physician-patient relationship has commenced, treatment 
generally must continue until:  (1) the patient’s condition no longer 
warrants treatment;38 (2) the physician and patient mutually agree to discon-
tinue treatment by the physician;39 (3) the patient discharges the physi-
cian;40 or (4) the physician unilaterally withdraws from treatment and gives 
the patient appropriate notice of his or her intention and an opportunity to 
secure a competent replacement.41 
The fourth scenario is the most likely to give rise to litigation; the 
prudent physician should treat the patient until she has had a reasonable 
time to find an alternative source of care.  “The amount of time necessary 
[to find a competent replacement] may depend upon such factors as the 
acuteness of the patient’s medical condition, the availability and acces-
sibility of alternative care, and the patient’s ability to afford such care.”42  
Again, to avoid a case of abandonment, the physician should establish a 
referral system to another physician to ensure continuity of care for those 
 
that he had “nothing to add” constituted proper withdrawal was a question of fact for the jury and 
did not constitute reasonable notice as a matter of law warranting summary judgment in his favor, 
nor do medical ethics preclude a physician from withdrawing from the physician-patient relation-
ship. Id.  The prevailing viewpoint is that a physician has the right to refuse on personal moral 
grounds to participate in continuing or foregoing life-sustaining treatment.  In exercising this 
right, however, the physician must transfer the care of the patient to another qualified physician. 
See Conservatorship of Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
ALBERT R. JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS 94 (2d ed. 1986)); see also AMA CURRENT 
OPINION, supra note 20, § 8.115 (“While physicians have the option of withdrawing from a case, 
they cannot do so without giving notice to the patient . . . sufficiently long in advance of with-
drawal to permit another medical attendant to be secured.”); Id. § 10.01. 
38. Grant, 580 S.E.2d at 534 (citing Church v. Perales, 39 S.W.3d 149, 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2000)); Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113, 119-120 (Mo. 1998); Brandt v. Grubin, 329 A.2d 
82, 87-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974); McManus v. Donlin, 127 N.W.2d 22, 28 (Wis. 1964). 
39. See Grant, 580 S.E.2d at 534 (citing Church, 39 S.W.3d at 164); Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 
119-120; Brandt, 329 A.2d at 87-88; McManus, 127 N.W.2d at 28. 
40. See Estate of Haar v. Ulwelling, 154 P.3d 67, 74 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (“[The physician] 
owed no duty of care to [the patient] after [the patient] missed his appointments and obtained 
treatment from others.”); Knapp v. Eppright, 783 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. App. 1989) (“Appellant’s 
theory of abandonment also does not apply because the evidence shows that [the] appellant 
terminated the doctor-patient relationship.  There can be no abandonment when the patient has 
voluntarily chosen not to return to her doctor.”); Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 285 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Ohio 
1972) (holding the physician-patient relationship terminated when the patient missed a scheduled 
appointment and did not see the physician again, and the relationship did not continue despite the 
fact the patient later secured a refill of a prescription that was prescribed during the relationship). 
41. Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 109 (2003).  A physician can 
lawfully abandon a patient “only . . . after due notice, and an ample opportunity afforded to secure 
the presence of other medical attendance.” Id.  See also King v. Zakaria, 634 S.E.2d 444, 448 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
42. CALIFORNIA PHYSICIAN’S LEGAL HANDBOOK § 34:35 (2006) (citing Scripps Clinic, 134 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 109). 
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minor patients who require additional care beyond the initial visit and do 
not consent to parental notice.43 
B. A SECOND POTENTIAL PROBLEM:  COSTS OF CARE CANNOT BE 
BILLED TO THE PARENT’S INSURER 
N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19(1)(d) creates a second dilemma, providing 
the costs of the care may not be billed to a third-party payor without the 
consent of the minor’s parent or guardian.44  Because a physician’s primary 
ethical duty is to the patient when it is lawful to provide care based on 
minor consent, affording this confidentiality takes precedence over the ina-
bility to bill the parent’s insurer.  An issue arises as to whether the minor 
may disavow a contractual obligation to make payments in this circum-
stance.  Minors may generally disavow otherwise valid contracts,45 and in 
North Dakota there are only two exceptions to this rule: first, minors remain 
obligated “to pay the reasonable value of things necessary for the minor’s 
support,”46 and; second, minors may not disavow contracts “entered into by 
the minor under the express authority or direction of a statute.”47  The 
minor’s support exception provided by N.D.C.C. section 14-10-12 might 
successfully support a provider’s right to payments from minors, especially 
in light of the court-made rule that, where a minor has the right to consent 
to treatment, he or she is responsible for paying for the treatment and may 
not disaffirm any contract made with a care provider.48 
IV. PROTECTING PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY 
As we have seen, physicians have developed a sophisticated code of 
ethics.  First, it is well-known that a physician is ethically required to use 
sound medical judgment, “holding the best interests of the patient as 
paramount” and “above obligations to other groups.”49  It is equally clear 
 
43. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-19(1)(b)-(c) (2009).  The N.D.C.C. contemplates whether 
parental notice occurs after the initial visit in the second or third trimester of the pregnancy. Id. 
44. Id. § 14-10-19(d)(1). 
45. Id. § 14-10-12. 
46. Id. § 14-10-13. 
47. Id. 
48. See generally DALE ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.02(c)(v); John D. Hodson, Annotation, 
Infant’s Liability for Medical, Dental or Hospital Services, 53 A.L.R.4th 1249, 1256-60, 1278-79 
(1987) (courts generally hold that medical, dental, and hospital services are necessaries that may 
not be disavowed by emancipated minors). 
49. AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, § 10.015, at 348.  It is clear the minor patient’s 
health is paramount, but her health might be improved by involving the parents over the minor’s 
objections.  The N.D.C.C., in a section setting out the physician’s right to refuse to treat based on 
minor consent, contemplates whether a patient’s best interests might be served by referring the 
minor to another physician to rekindle a strong physician-patient relationship. N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 14-10-19(2) (2009). 
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that in this collaborative effort to safeguard life and health, physicians “best 
contribute to this alliance by serving as their patient’s advocate and by 
fostering” patient rights, including both the right to confidentiality and to 
receive information regarding benefits, risks, and costs of appropriate 
treatment alternatives.50 
A. MINOR CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
By requiring physicians and other providers to encourage the pregnant 
minor to involve her parents, N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19(2) is consistent 
with the Ethical Opinion of the AMA’s Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs.51  Of course, this recognizes that parental involvement is normally 
beneficial to the minor.  Should the minor continue to insist on confiden-
tiality despite the physician’s concern that lack of parental involvement is 
contrary to the minor’s best interest, the statute provides a safeguard that 
health care providers “may not be compelled against their best judgment to 
treat a minor based on the minor’s own consent.”52  This protection of 
professional judgment is perhaps unnecessary because the statute authorizes 
a physician or other health care professional to notify the minor’s parents if 
doing so is in the patient’s best interest.53 
In fact, N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19(3) specifically authorizes the phy-
sician to notify the minor’s parents about the treatment course despite the 
minor’s objections if disclosure is in the patient’s best interests.54  The 
statute fleshes out the circumstances where a physician or other health care 
professional is authorized to inform the minor’s parents or guardians about 
any health care services given or needed after discussion with the minor:  
(1) “failure to inform the parent or guardian would seriously jeopardize the 
health of the minor or her unborn child”; (2) major surgery or prolonged 
hospitalization is needed; or (3) “[i]nforming the parent or guardian would 
benefit the health of the minor or her unborn child.”55  Thus, the statute 
 
50. AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, § 10.01, at 341; see also id. § 5.05, at 149. 
51. Id. § 5.055, at 166-67. 
52. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-19(2) (2009).  At first glance, the language allowing physician 
withdrawal is suggestive of a “conscience clause.” See discussion infra Part VI.  The purpose here 
is unclear, however, because providing pregnancy-related care does not appear to pose the ethical 
conundrum that abortion does.  Moreover, it is perhaps preferable that a physician struggle with 
the decision of whether to notify the parents over the patient’s objections based on the patient’s 
best interest—which should be an unusual circumstance—rather than ignore the issue and with-
draw from providing care.  The exception, of course, may be in the circumstance where the 
physician–patient relationship is damaged by the disagreement to the extent that judgment dictates 
withdrawal will benefit the patient by providing her the opportunity to forge a new and stronger 
physician-patient relationship. 
53. § 14-10-19(3). 
54. Id. (emphasis added). 
55. Id. 
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recognizes the potential complications providers may face in meeting their 
ethical obligations to safeguard both the minor patient’s confidentiality and 
best interests.  It is axiomatic that it is in the patient’s best interest to protect 
her health and the life of her unborn child.56 
B. GENERAL ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PROVIDING CARE 
FOR MINORS 
A patient’s best interests are not always served by retaining strict 
confidentiality.  A potential conflict is likely to be particularly acute in 
rendering care to minors.  An Ethical Opinion of the Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs of the AMA notes that “[p]hysicians who treat minors have 
an ethical duty to promote the autonomy of minor patients by involving 
them in the medical decision making process to a degree commensurate 
with their abilities.”57  But minors may benefit from parental involvement, 
and “[w]hen minors request confidential services, physicians should 
encourage them to involve their parents.”58  Where the issue cannot be 
resolved, “unless the law requires otherwise, physicians should permit a 
competent minor to consent to medical care and should not notify parents 
without the patient’s consent.”59 
The exceptions are limited.  AMA Current Opinion E-5.055 provides, 
“[c]onfidentiality may be justifiably breached in situations for which confi-
dentiality for adults may be breached.”60  To further complicate matters, 
 
56. While the patient’s best interests are paramount, in the case of pregnancy-related health 
care—as opposed to abortion—the interests of the unborn child must also be weighed. § 14-10-
19(3)(c). 
57. AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, § 5.055, at 166-67. 
58. Id.  The physician-patient discussion may prove valuable to the minor. Id.  As AMA 
Current Opinion E-5.055 notes, this effort includes ascertaining “the minor’s reasons for not 
involving their parents and correcting misconceptions that may be motivating their objections.” Id. 
59. Id. (emphasis added). 
60. AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, § 5.055, at 166.  AMA Current Opinion E-5.05 
refers to a number of situations in which confidentiality may be breached, such as when a patient 
threatens to inflict serious bodily harm to another person or to self with reasonable likelihood it 
will be carried out, and as required by law—for communicable diseases, gunshot and knife 
wounds, etc.—in which case the patient should be notified of the disclosure. Id. § 5.05, at 149.  
North Dakota, like most states, requires physicians to report suspected child abuse and child 
neglect: 
Any physician, nurse, dentist, optometrist, medical examiner or coroner, or any other 
medical or mental health professional . . . having knowledge of or reasonable cause to 
suspect that a child is abused or neglected, or has died as a result of abuse or neglect, 
shall report the circumstances to the department if the knowledge or suspicion is 
derived from information received by that person in that person’s official or 
professional capacity. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03(1) (2009).  The N.D.C.C. definition of a neglected child is similar 
to that used to define a deprived child in chapter 27-20. Id. § 50-25.2-01(11).  The N.D.C.C. offers 
a broad definition of a deprived child, including the all too common situation where the child “[i]s 
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AMA Current Opinion E-5.055 recognizes a tension that may arise between 
breach of confidentiality on the one hand, and dereliction of the duty to 
warn a third person that the patient may constitute a danger on the other.61  
Furthermore, with regard to minors, confidentiality is not required “when 
necessary to enable the parent to make an informed decision about treat-
ment for the minor or when such a breach is necessary to avert serious harm 
to the minor.”62  As noted previously, N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19(3) recog-
nizes the “patient’s best interest” exception, allowing parental disclosure in 
such a case.63 
C. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS:  PREGNANCY CARE AND MINORS 
AMA Current Opinion E-5.055 also provides specific guidance regard-
ing confidentiality concerning the provision of treatment where privacy 
concerns are understandably heightened—such private and intimate matters 
as reproduction or mental health.64  The Opinion recognizes in these private 
and sensitive matters that parental involvement may be counterproductive, 
but generally parental involvement is healthy and should be encouraged.65  
In sum, N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19 does not appear to pose any unusual 
 
present in an environment subjecting the child to exposure to a controlled substance . . . .” See id. 
§ 27-20-02(8)(g). 
61. AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, § 5.055, at 166-67.  For example, in the famous 
California case, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the Supreme Court of 
California held mental health professionals have a duty to protect individuals who are threatened 
with bodily harm by the professional’s patient. 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976). 
62. AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, § 5.055, at 167. 
63. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-19(3) (2009). 
64. AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, § 5.055, at 166-67. 
65. Id. The opinion provides: 
When an immature minor requests contraceptive services, pregnancy-related care 
(including pregnancy testing, prenatal and postnatal care, and delivery services), or 
treatment for sexually transmitted disease, drug and alcohol abuse, or mental illness, 
physicians must recognize that requiring parental involvement may be counter-
productive to the health of the patient.  Physicians should encourage parental involve-
ment in these situations.  However, if the minor continues to object, his or her wishes 
ordinarily should be respected.  If the physician is uncomfortable with providing 
services without parental involvement, and alternative confidential services are avail-
able, the minor may be referred to those services.  In cases when the physician be-
lieves that without parental involvement and guidance, the minor will face a serious 
health threat, and there is reason to believe that the parents will be helpful and 
understanding, disclosing the problem to the parents is ethically justified.  When the 
physician does breach confidentiality to the parents, he or she must discuss the reasons 
for the breach with the minor prior to the disclosure. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Of course, whether an ethical justification is tantamount to legal justifica-
tion is another matter.  But, because the “breach” is limited to circumstances in which the failure 
to disclose is likely to pose a health threat to the minor, and the standard of care is to disclose, it 
seems likely that no liability would result in the circumstance. See infra text accompanying note 
91. 
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ethical difficulties.  By contrast, the ethical conundrums posed in the 
abortion debate are significant.66 
D. HIPAA AND MINOR CONFIDENTIALITY 
N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19 grants a minor the right to consent to 
limited “pregnancy testing and pain management” without the consent of a 
parent.67  The Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s 
(HIPAA)68 confidentiality protections allow states to grant minors the 
ability to consent without parental notification; the regulation promulgated 
to implement HIPAA generally defers to state law.69  The opposite concern 
is that in providing a mechanism to notify the parents despite the minor’s 
objections, the statute breaches a minor’s right to privacy and confiden-
tiality in conflict with HIPAA regulations.  This concern appears to be 
groundless.  Again, HIPAA explicitly defers to state law in this area:  “the 
addition of paragraphs (g)(3)(ii)(A) and (B) of § 164.502, clarify that State 
and other applicable law governs when such law explicitly requires, per-
mits, or prohibits disclosure of protected health information to a parent.”70  
HIPAA does afford minors protection from parental notification in circum-
stances where the minor might be endangered by such notification, 
explicitly preempting state laws to the contrary.71  Nothing in Senate Bill 
2394 requires parental notification if such notification would endanger the 
minor.72 
V. TORT LITIGATION DUE TO BREACH OF RIGHT 
TO CONFIDENTIALITY 
Professional care organizations have cause to be concerned that notify-
ing the parents without the minor’s consent may give rise to a medical 
 
66. See infra Parts VI-VII. 
67. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-19 (2009). 
68. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
69. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2009). 
70. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
53182, 53201 (proposed Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 164). 
71. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2009). 
72. The N.D.C.C. provides the circumstances in which the health care professional may 
notify the minor’s parents about the pregnancy care services without the minor’s consent—these 
include when failure to inform would jeopardize the minor’s health, when surgery or 
hospitalization is required, and a general catch-all where informing the parent “would benefit the 
health of the minor or her unborn child.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-19(3) (2009) (emphasis 
added). 
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negligence claim.73  Any negligence claim is comprised of four elements.74  
For example, a plaintiff filing a tort claim alleging medical negligence due 
to an unauthorized disclosure must show:  (1) that the medical professional 
had a duty75 of confidentiality to plaintiff; (2) breach of the duty;76 (3) 
 
73. See, e.g., Goins v. Mercy Ctr. For Health Care Servs., 667 N.E.2d 652, 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996) (allowing a tort claim for breach of a confidentiality act against an employer-hospital). 
74. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 130 (10th ed. 2000).  It is settled law there are four elements to a cause of action in 
negligence:  duty, breach, causation, and damage. Id.  See infra notes 96-99 (citing cases 
specifically recognizing the existence of a cause of action in tort against medical professionals for 
violation of duty of confidentiality). 
75. According to Professor David Owen: 
Few principles are more fundamentally important to modern society than duty.  As 
obligation to oneself and others—to one’s family, friends, neighbors, business asso-
ciates, clients, customers, community, nation, and God—duty is the thread that binds 
humans to the world, to the communities in which they live.  Duty constrains and 
channels human behavior in a socially responsible way before the fact, and it provides 
a basis for judging the propriety of behavior thereafter.  Duty flows from millennia of 
social customs, philosophy, and religion.  And duty is the overarching concept of the 
law.  Duty is central to the law of torts.  Negligence law divides human choices to en-
gage in (or refrain from) foreseeably harmful conduct as proper or improper, and 
choices are adjudged improper only if they involve a breach of duty.  Thus, serving as 
the foundational element of a negligence claim, duty provides the front door to 
recovery for the principal cause of action in the law of torts:  On the way to possible 
redress, every negligence claim must pass through the duty portal that bounds the 
scope of tort recovery for accidental harm. 
David Owen, Duty Rules, 54 VAND. L. REV. 767, 767-68 (2001).  The California Supreme Court, 
noting that “legal duties are not discoverable facts,” and that duty “is not sacrosanct in itself, but a 
conclusory expression that liability should be imposed for damages done,” set out the major 
factors to balance in determining whether a duty exits: 
The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and 
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of 
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to 
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, 
and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).  The California 
Supreme Court also noted the “most important” factor is foreseeability, noting generally: 
[A] defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by 
his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dan-
gerous . . . . [But] . . . when the avoidance of foreseeable harm requires a defendant to 
control the conduct of another person, or to warn of such conduct, the common law 
has traditionally imposed liability only if the defendant bears some special relationship 
to the dangerous person or to the potential victim.  Since the relationship between a 
therapist and his patient satisfies this requirement, we need not here decide whether 
foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect 
a potential victim of another’s conduct. 
Id. at 434-35. (citations omitted).  Three of the four elements—duty, causation, and damages—are 
the object of intense study, with immense literature devoted to each. See infra notes 78-80. 
76. While duty questions present complicated multi-factorial questions of law, whether a 
breach occurred is generally a question of fact for the jury. See, e.g., Cox v. Paul, 828 N.E.2d 907, 
911-12 (Ind. 2005) (“The question of the breach of a duty is usually one for the trier of fact.  
However, if any reasonable jury would conclude that a specific standard of care was or was not 
breached, the question of breach becomes a question of law for the court.” (citations omitted)). 
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causation;77 and (4) injury—that is, damages.78  In Greenwood v. 
Paracelsus Health Care Corp.,79 the court simply restated the negligence 
elements as requiring a plaintiff to “present evidence establishing the 
applicable standard of care, a violation of that standard, and a causal 
relationship between the violation and the harm complained of.”80  The 
court continued, “Medical malpractice cases typically involve a complex 
jumble of medical, technical, and ordinary fact questions.”81  A jury might 
resolve “ordinary fact questions” without reference to expert opinion, but 
technical and medical questions require expert testimony.82  Due to “the 
technical and complicated nature” of medicine, case law generally requires 
the plaintiff to “establish through expert testimony the degree of care and 
skill required of a physician, and whether specified acts fall below that 
standard of care.”83 
 
77. The philosophical difficulty of proving causation is notorious and probably insoluble. 
See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 236 (5th ed. 1984) 
(noting causation is a notoriously broad concept—like beauty, it may be in the eye of the 
beholder:  “the fatal tresspass done by Eve was cause of all our woe”), the difficulty exists in 
practice as well. See Berger & Twercki, supra note 22, at 261 (noting “safety and efficacy studies 
done by manufacturers to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval will often provide 
inadequate data to prove the causal relationship between a toxic agent and the harm suffered by a 
plaintiff”); Dean J. Haas, Falling Down on the Job:  Workers’ Compensation Shifts from a No-
Fault to a Worker-Fault Paradigm, 79 N.D. L. REV. 203, 249-50 (2003) (criticizing the use of a 
lax causation standard in apportioning benefits under the “aggravation statute,” N.D.C.C. section 
65-05-15, which reduces benefits when a work injury combines with a pre-existing condition).  It 
is simple and unfair to obtain an Independent Medical Evaluations opinion to apportion cause. 
See, e.g., Balliet v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 297 N.W.2d 791, 794 (N.D. 1980) (“Puta-
tively, almost every injury could, with sufficient scrutiny, be linked to some pre-existing weakness 
or susceptibility.”).  Some argue a more objective standard should be required to reduce a 
worker’s benefits, requiring that the pre-existing condition remained active at the time of the work 
injury. Haas, supra, at 249-50.  Proof the pre-existing condition remained active at the time of the 
work injury simply requires that the pre-existing condition constitutes a permanent impairment, or 
resulted in permanent work restrictions. Id. 
78. A huge amount of literature exists on every aspect of damages, from the concrete proof 
of damages—including economic damages and noneconomic damages, punitive damages, etc.—
to the rather esoteric nature of tort that can give rise to damages, which might consist of bodily 
injury, or more abstract, involving nearly any form of mental distress, such as outrage, 
humiliation, damage to reputation, and the like. See generally Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 136, 137 (1992). 
79. 2001 ND 28, 622 N.W.2d 195. 
80. Greenwood, ¶ 10, 622 N.W.2d at 199 (citations omitted). 
81. Id. ¶ 16, 622 N.W.2d at 200. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1217-18 (Ind. 2000)).  In North 
Dakota, N.D.C.C. section 28-01-46 generally requires a plaintiff alleging medical evidence to 
serve an expert opinion. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2009).  The statute applies before trial, 
requiring a “preliminary screening,” thus “designed to dispose of frivolous or nuisance medical 
malpractice actions at an early stage of the proceedings.” Greenwood, ¶ 8, 622 N.W.2d at 199.  
The Greenwood parties devoted “much of their arguments to N.D.C.C. section 28-01-46, res ipsa 
loquitur, and whether the claim “fit under traditional res ipsa loquitur concepts [or] within one of 
the exceptions [to the need to submit an expert opinion] in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46.” Id. ¶ 12.  The 
court found it unnecessary to address these issues, concluding the plaintiff had “established a 
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The question of whether a duty exists is a question of law for the 
courts.84  Greenwood is illustrative; there, the plaintiff brought a medical 
malpractice claim against a physician who allegedly left gauze in the plain-
tiff’s ear after surgery, causing injury.85  As to the first element, the defen-
dant physician admitted the applicable standard of care required removal of 
the gauze.86  In sum, the nature of the duty—the standard of care87—might 
be admitted by the defendant physician or provided by the plaintiff’s expert, 
who might rely on general ethical principles, for example,88 or guided by 
reference to a statute or regulation—in North Dakota, violation of a statu-
tory or regulatory duty is generally considered evidence of negligence, not 
negligence per se.89  The Greenwood court similarly addressed the defen-
dant physician’s argument that breach of the standard of care must be 
established through expert testimony; while the circumstances might 
 
prima facie case without relying upon res ipsa loquitur or upon the exceptions to N.D.C.C. § 28-
01-46.” Id. 
84. See, e.g., Long v. Jaszczak, 2004 ND 194, ¶ 12, 688 N.W.2d 173, 177 (noting “[a] 
plaintiff in an informed-consent case must establish breach of a physician’s duty of disclosure, 
causation, and injury,” and “[g]enerally, whether a duty exists is a ‘preliminary question of law for 
the court to decide.’” (citation omitted)). 
85. Greenwood, ¶ 5, 622 N.W.2d at 198. 
86. Id. ¶ 13, 622 N.W.2d at 200. 
87. It is uncontroverted that due to the special nature of the physician-patient relationship, 
the physician owes his patients a number of legal duties.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979) (“A fiduciary relation exists between two persons when one of 
them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the 
scope of that relation.”).  AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, §§ 5.05, 5.055 (discussing the 
duty to ensure confidentiality). 
88. See, e.g., Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding section 
8.08 of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics, entitled Informed Consent, provides the relevant 
standard of care “[b]ecause the AMA is an organization composed of experts in the field of 
medicine, its code of ethics and the duties of physicians prescribed therein should be understood 
to reflect the standard of care of the profession on the issue of informed consent”), overruled by 
Blotner v. Doreika, 678 S.E.2d 80, 84 (2009) (holding the common law doctrine of informed 
consent does not exist in the state, but rather is governed by Georgia statute); see also Hall v. 
Anwar, 774 So. 2d 41, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“We recognize that some medical standards 
of care are influenced by medical ethics.”). 
89. Gonzalez v. Tounjian, 2003 ND 121, ¶ 20, 665 N.W.2d 705, 713; Haider v. Finken, 239 
N.W.2d 508, 516 (N.D. 1976) (holding a violation of highway safety statutes is only evidence of 
negligence for the trier of fact to consider; it does not constitute negligence per se).  The 
California Supreme Court expounded upon the concept of per se negligence, explaining an 
emergency room physician who failed to report battered child syndrome “will not be heard to say 
that other members of his profession would not have made such a report,” concluding California 
law requiring the physician to report the child abuse was a statutory duty. See Landeros v. Flood, 
551 P.2d 389, 394 n.8 (Cal. 1976).  This is consistent, broadly speaking, with the principle that 
“the existence of a statute or ordinance authorizing particular conduct is a factor which militates in 
favor of the conclusion that [it was done in good faith].” Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 
1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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require expert testimony, the claim might simply present an ordinary fact 
question for the jury.90 
The common law tort for breach of confidentiality is recognized in 
most states, generally providing for liability whenever one owes a duty of 
confidentiality and breaches that duty.91  Such claims may arise under an 
alternative contract theory as well.92  Actions against those who breach 
confidentiality are nothing new; in fact, remedies for improperly divulging 
confidential information began to emerge as early as the eighteenth cen-
tury.93  In 1920, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that because doctors 
were “bound [by] professional honor and the ethics of [their] high 
profession” to maintain patient confidentiality, a “wrongful breach of such 
confidence, and a betrayal of such trust, would give rise to a civil action for 
the damages naturally flowing from such wrong.”94  In 1985, the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts held a physician owes a patient a duty not to 
disclose confidential information gained through the physician-patient 
relationship, and “a violation of that duty gives rise to a cause of action 
sounding in tort.”95  Throughout the country, recognition of similar torts has 
since become common.96  In fact, litigation for a confidentiality breach by a 
medical professional is relatively straight-forward because the duty of 
physicians to protect their patients’ confidentiality is well known.97  In sum, 
 
90. Greenwood, ¶15, 622 N.W.2d at 200 (citing N.D. R. EVID. 702).  The court explained 
why, in this case, presenting an expert opinion on the issue of breach wasn’t necessary:  “[I]t is 
unclear what the substance of such an expert’s testimony would have been . . . .  Whether [the 
physician] actually left gauze in Greenwood’s ear was an ordinary fact question for the jury, and 
an expert’s opinion would not have assisted the jury in resolving that question.” Id. 
91. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:  Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 136 (2007) (explaining the scope of privacy rights that ground 
the right to confidentiality generally). See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing 
the duty of medical professionals to protect their patient’s confidentiality). 
92. E.g., Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 830 (Ala. 1973).  In Horne, the court recognized a 
cause of action for the unauthorized release of medical records, holding the unauthorized 
disclosure of intimate details of a patient’s health may amount to such unwarranted publicizing of 
one’s private affairs, with which the public has no legitimate concern, “as to cause outrage or 
cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.” Id.  The Horne 
court held the unauthorized release of medical records may amount to a breach of an implied 
contract of confidentiality on the part of the doctor. Id. at 832. 
93. Richards & Solove, supra note 93, at 124. 
94. Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920). 
95. Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 124 (Mass. 1985). 
96. Richards & Solove, supra note 93, at 158. 
97. See, e.g., Randi A.J. v. Long Island Surgi-Center, 842 N.Y.S.2d 558, 565 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2007) (holding liability resulted from a nurse calling a twenty-year-old patient’s home, 
providing the patient’s mother with sufficient information so the mother could determine her 
daughter had an abortion (citing Public Health Law § 2803-c(3)(f) (“Every patient shall have the 
right to have privacy in treatment and in caring for personal needs, confidentiality in the treatment 
of personal and medical records, and security in storing personal possessions.”)); Sloan v. Farmer, 
217 S.W.3d 763, 767-68 (Tex. App. 2007) (recognizing the existence of a cause of action in tort 
against a physician for a violation of the duty of confidentiality that arises from the physician-
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the universally recognized duty to protect confidentiality is sufficient to 
support a tort action under state law for damages resulting from an unau-
thorized disclosure.98  Whether disclosure is authorized—for example, to 
parents—is another issue, also generally left to state law,99 including claims 
that may be fashioned as an invasion of privacy tort.100  Because the statutes 
 
patient relationship, but dismissing the case due to the plaintiff’s failure to serve the expert report 
required in cases alleging medical negligence); Grimminger v. Maitra, 887 A.2d 276, 279-80 (Pa. 
Super. 2005) (recognizing a distinct cause of action for invasion of privacy and a separate, distinct 
cause of action for a breach of physician-patient confidentiality); Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 
353-54 (Fla. 2002) (describing the psychiatrist-patient relationship as that of a fiduciary, the court 
concluded a civil action for damages arose from the breach of a statutory duty of confidentiality 
and privacy); Berger v. Sonneland, 26 P.3d 257, 263 (Wash. 2001) (reversing a summary 
judgment award because a question of fact existed regarding whether the disclosure caused injury, 
the court held “a tort action exists under [state law] for damages resulting from the unauthorized 
disclosure of confidential information related to health care and obtained within the physician-
patient relationship”).  The duty is based on the nature of the relationship, buttressed by univer-
sally recognized ethical precepts.  According to the ancient Hippocratic Oath, circa 400 B.C.E., 
“Whatever, in connection with my professional service, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, 
in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all 
such should be kept secret.” See also AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, §§ 5.05, 5.055. 
98. Because a statute or general ethical principle is only evidence of the existence or absence 
of a legal duty, the question would be more difficult if different rules point different ways. See 
discussion supra note 91.  Here, the statutes and ethical principles align—generally, a minor must 
obtain parental consent to medical treatment. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-10-19, 23-12-13 
(2009); AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, §§ 5.05, 5.055.  These laws and principles may 
determine the parameters of the confidentiality standard of care for medical providers who treat 
minors—in other words, the circumstances under which the general confidentiality rules are 
waived, with the concordant obligation to disclose to parents. 
99. One exception is HIPAA’s preemption of any state law that would otherwise require 
disclosure to parents when such would endanger the health of the minor. See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.502(g)(5) (2009); supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
100. The causes of action may include any number of theories involving invasions of 
privacy.  For example, the Second Restatement of Torts sets forth those four distinct categories of 
invasion of privacy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-E (1977).  According to the 
Restatement, “[a]n action for an invasion of privacy is comprised of four distinct torts:  (1) 
intrusion upon seclusion, (2) appropriation of name or likeness, (3) publicity given to a private 
life, (4) publicity placing the person in a false light.” Id. § 652B court citations.  The tort of breach 
of physician-patient confidentiality can readily be distinguished from the torts of appropriation of 
name or likeness, publicity given to a private life, and publicity placing the person in a false light.  
It will be the rare circumstance where a physician decides to publish, publicize, or appropriate 
confidential medical information. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1977) (recognizing a cause of action against a psychiatrist who breached the duty of confiden-
tiality by publishing his former patient’s “thoughts, feelings, and emotions . . . their most intimate 
personal relationships,” in his book, concluding the un-named tort was a kind of violation of 
privacy).  Consequently, there seems to be a substantive distinction between these three categories 
of privacy liability and the tort of breach of physician-patient confidentiality, with the exception of 
the rare circumstance where a physician takes the extraordinary measure of publishing a patient’s 
confidential medical information without consent.  The final category of privacy invasion plain-
tiffs consider raising in conjunction with the tort of breach of physician-patient confidentiality is 
“intrusion upon seclusion.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.  According to the 
Second Restatement of Torts, the intrusion upon seclusion tort can be easily distinguished as a 
substantive matter from the tort of breach of physician-patient confidentiality. See id.  While an 
action for breach of physician-patient confidentiality is normally based on a negligence theory, 
intrusion upon seclusion is a species of intentional tort. Pro Golf Mfg., Inc. v. Tribune Review 
Newspaper Co., 809 A.2d 243, 248 (Pa. 2002).  Each of the privacy torts may be distinguished 
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and ethical principles generally authorize notice to parents regarding the 
minor’s medical care, it is difficult to envision successful litigation against 
a physician due to such disclosure. 
Additionally, a plaintiff might allege violations of HIPAA regulations 
as the basis of a suit for breach of confidentiality.  Such a plaintiff must 
address the fact that in enacting HIPAA, Congress did not see fit to bestow 
a private right of action.101  But the legislature’s failure to create a specific 
cause of action is not necessarily determinative because the cause of action 
may also be implied.102 
Even if a federal cause of action is not implied, however, the HIPAA 
privacy rule could serve as the basis for a tort suit brought under state law 
for a violation of the patient’s right to confidentiality.  How?  It is done 
simply by utilizing the principle that a statute or regulation can serve as 
evidence of the confidentiality standard.103  In 2006, HIPAA was invoked 
as the basis for such privacy standards in two significant cases.  In Sorensen 
v. Barbuto,104 a personal injury plaintiff received treatment from a physi-
cian, who subsequently produced the plaintiff’s medical records and 
engaged in ex parte communications with defense counsel in the personal 
injury suit.105  The trial court agreed to exclude the physician’s testi-
mony.106  After prevailing in the personal injury action, the plaintiff filed an 
 
from the tort of breach of confidentiality. See Burger v. Blair Med. Assocs., Inc., 928 A.2d 246, 
250-51 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff’d, 964 A.2d 374 (Pa. 2009) (discussing substantive differences 
between physician-patient confidentiality breaches and each of the four Restatement theories for 
invasion of privacy). 
101. Under HIPAA, individuals do not have a right to court action. Compliance and 
Enforcement, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,600, 82,601 (Dec. 28, 2000); see also Webb v. Smart Document 
Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007).  See generally HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 290aa-
290ff (2010); id. § 290dd-2(a); Fisher v. Yale Univ., No. X10NNHCV044003207S, 2006 WL 
1075035, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2006) (citing Logan v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 357 F. 
Supp. 2d 149, 155 (D.D.C. 2004)) (“[C]ourts have repeatedly held that Congress did not intend to 
create a private cause of action under HIPAA.”). 
102. See Trade ‘N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Americas, Inc., 2001 ND 116, ¶ 11, 628 
N.W.2d 707, 711 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).  In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly pro-
viding one, several factors are relevant.  First, is the plaintiff one of the class for 
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, . . . that is, does the statute create a . . . 
right in favor of the plaintiff?  Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, 
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . .   Third, is it 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a 
remedy for the plaintiff? 
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
103. Gonzalez v. Tounjian, 2003 ND 121, ¶ 20, 665 N.W.2d 705, 713. 
104. 143 P.3d 295 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
105. Sorensen, 143 P.3d at 298. 
106. Id. 
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action against the physician.107  The appeals court agreed the duty to not 
disclose confidential personal information arises out of trust and confidence 
in the physician-patient relationship, and the court concluded a tortious 
action may arise from the breach of that confidentiality.108  While the 
plaintiffs recognized HIPAA did not create a private right of action, they 
argued HIPAA’s professional confidentiality standards constituted the 
proper standard of care.109 
Similarly, in Acosta v. Byrum,110 the court found in the HIPAA rule a 
basis for determination of the appropriate level of care in relation to the 
privacy of medical information.111  While the court recognized the patient 
could not assert a private right of action under HIPAA, it held the privacy 
rule may be used to establish an appropriate professional standard for the 
protection of health care information.112  In short, just as N.D.C.C. sections 
14-10-19 and 23-12-13 are evidence that parental disclosure does not 
necessarily violate a professional standard to protect the minor patient’s 
confidentiality, the HIPAA confidentiality rule could similarly be used as 
evidence of the professional standard. 
VI. GENERAL ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO 
PREGNANCY AND ABORTION 
Abortion, more than any other topic, divides the American people; it is 
not surprising that it engenders profound philosophical and ethical debate.  
There are significant constitutional and ethical principles relating to a minor 
female’s right to make such significant decisions regarding her reproductive 
life.  First, the basics:  AMA Current Opinion E-2.01 states ethical prin-
ciples “do not prohibit a physician from performing an abortion.”113  
Regarding minors, AMA Current Opinion E-2.015 requires physicians to 
ensure they follow their legal obligations regarding parental involvement 
and “strongly encourage minors to discuss their pregnancy with their 
parents.”114  As always, informed consent is crucial.115  AMA Current 
 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 300. 
109. Id. at 299 n.2. 
110. 638 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
111. Acosta, 638 S.E.2d at 253. 
112. Id. (holding “HIPAA is inapplicable beyond providing evidence of the duty of care 
owed by Dr. Faber with regards to the privacy of plaintiff’s medical records,” but through this 
mechanism the plaintiff provided evidence of one of the necessary elements of negligence).  Thus 
begins what is likely to be a line of civil cases using HIPAA as a standard for the measurement of 
the duty to maintain health care privacy, similar to the use by plaintiffs’ attorneys of the clinical 
practice guidelines developed and published by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality. 
113. AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, § 2.01, at 4. 
114. Id. § 2.015, at 5. 
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Opinion E-2.015 recognizes “[p]hysicians should not feel or be compelled 
to require minors to involve their parents before deciding whether to 
undergo an abortion,” but the patients should be told “under what circum-
stances (e.g. life-threatening emergency) the minor’s confidentiality will 
need to be abrogated.”116  But, this opinion does not address the physician’s 
personal ethics—that is, the right to practice medicine in accordance with 
one’s conscience.  Of course, this ethical dilemma may not be simple; phy-
sicians must consider both their personal conscience and the weighty 
general duty to provide quality medical care to the public. 
One manifestation of the national controversy over abortion is the 
“conscience clause,” which is a statutory provision that allows providers to 
opt out of providing abortion services.117  Fierce advocates of patient rights 
re-label conscience clauses as “refusal clauses.”118  Transcendent moral 




117. See generally 1 AM. JUR. 2d Abortion and Birth Control § 80 (2010) (indicating a state 
may constitutionally permit private hospitals, health care facilities, physicians, nurses, and em-
ployees to refuse to perform or participate in performing abortions for “ethical, moral, religious, or 
professional reasons,” but may not extend such an institutional “conscience” clause to public 
hospitals or facilities (citation omitted)). 
118. See, e.g., Maureen K. Bailey, Contraceptive Insurance Mandates and Catholic Charities 
v. Superior Court of Sacramento:  Towards a New Understanding of Women’s Health, 9 TEX. 
REV. L. & POL. 367, 369 n.7 (2005) (“The ACLU refers to these clauses as ‘refusal clauses,’ a 
term recently selected by the ACLU for its political purposes” (citing George Gund Foundation, 
Pro-Choice Resource Center & Reproductive Freedom Project, American Civil Liberties Union, 
Conscientious Exemptions and Reproductive Rights, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, NATIONAL MEETING 
(2000))); Heather Rae Skeeles, Note, Patient Autonomy Versus Religious Freedom:  Should State 
Legislatures Require Catholic Hospitals to Provide Emergency Contraception to Rape Victims?, 
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1007, 1022 n.75 (2003) (“[Religious Refusal laws] offer important 
protections for health care professionals but may endanger patients” (citing AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION REPROD. FREEDOM PROJECT, RELIGIOUS REFUSALS AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 10 
(2002))); see also Jason Green, Commentary, Refusal Clauses and the Weldon Amendment:  
Inherently Unconstitutional and a Dangerous Precedent, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 401, 409 (2005); 
Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe Is Not Enough:  When Religion Controls 
Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 727 (2004).  In brief, the legal argument is that state 
conscience clauses “fail the undue burden test by presenting a substantial obstacle for women 
seeking [such services], particularly if the patient is in a rural area with few or no alternatives.” 
Green, supra, at 409 (presenting the argument in connection with providing the emergency 
contraceptive mifepristone).  Many of these commentators also advocate compulsory coverage by 
all insurers—and increasingly, for compulsory provision by all health care providers—of many of 
these controversial services and products, especially contraceptives.  At least twenty states require 
employer health insurance plans to include coverage of contraceptives. See generally Bailey, 
supra, at 373 n.31.  The California Supreme Court has upheld such a provision against attack that 
compulsory coverage violates the First Amendment rights of the nonprofit employer. See Catholic 
Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 93 n.20 (Cal. 2004), cert denied, 543 
U.S. 816 (2004).  The California court noted, as of that time, at least nineteen other states had 
enacted similar laws. Id. 
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many aspects of health care, not just abortion.119  These issues have long 
engaged the concerns of bioethicists, theologians, and law professors.120  
Perhaps in light of the profound competing values involved in the abortion 
debate, the AMA has no single statement on conscientious objections, but 
addresses various facets and issues through a combination of policy 
documents.121 
The history of conscience clause statutes is intriguing; this brief 
overview cannot do it justice.  It is a well-settled principle of American law 
that patients receiving medical care ultimately are autonomous agents, 
retaining the right to choose what is to be done to their bodies.122  But, it is 
 
119. These include issues concerning the provision or assisting the provision of many other 
procedures, medications, and materials, such as:  provision of birth control procedures; 
pharmaceutical abortifacients; assisted reproductive techniques, such as implementing the new 
technological means to predict or even influence the characteristics of the fetus, including the sex; 
sex change procedures and therapies; assisted suicide; euthanasia; sterilization; cloning; pre-natal 
human experimentation; stem cell research; harvesting of fetal and other organs and tissue; organ 
transplantation; and others. 
120. See generally supra note 122.  See also William W. Bassett, Private Religious 
Hospitals:  Limitations Upon Autonomous Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455 (2001); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled:  Free Exercise 
Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991); Brietta R. Clark, 
When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty and the Liberty of Conscience:  A 
Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 82 OR. L. REV. 625 (2003); Judith F. Daar, A Clash 
at the Bedside:  Patient Autonomy v. a Physician’s Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 
1241 (1993); Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption:  An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Under-
standing of the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Diversity, 59 UMKC L. REV. 591 (1991); 
Maureen Kramlich, The Abortion Debate Thirty Years Later:  From Choice to Coercion, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 783 (2004); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); Martha S. Swartz, 
“Conscience Clauses” or “Unconscionable Clauses”:  Personal Beliefs Versus Professional 
Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 269 (2006); Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting 
the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 177 (1993); Katherine A. 
White, Note, Crisis of Conscience:  Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and 
Patients’ Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703 (1999). 
121. The most significant of these are AMA Current Opinions E-9.12 and E-10.05.  See 
AMA CURRENT OPINION, supra note 20, §§ 9.12, 10.05, at 325, 354-55.  The first of these is 
Opinion E-9.12, entitled “Patient-Physician Relationship: Respect for Law and Human Rights.” 
Id. § 9.12, at 325 (noting while the creation of the physician-patient is contractual in nature, and 
both are generally free to decline to create a relationship, “physicians who offer their services to 
the public may not decline to accept patients because of race, color, religion, national origin, 
sexual orientation, or any other basis that would constitute invidious discrimination”).  The second 
is Opinion E-10.05, “Potential Patients.” Id. § 10.05, at 354-55 (discussing that unless otherwise 
addressed, a physician may decline to provide a “specific treatment . . . incompatible with the 
physician’s personal, religious, or moral beliefs”). 
122. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an 
assault.”).  The paternalistic view that “doctors know best,” and so need not involve patients in 
medical decision-making, has long since become an anachronism. See generally John F. Kennedy 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 673 (N.J. 1971) (holding a twenty-two-year-old woman’s 
physician was justified in ordering a life-saving blood transfusion over the patient’s surrogate’s 
religion- based objections, the court said, “When the hospital and staff are thus involuntary hosts 
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equally true that at the beginning of the physician-patient relationship, a 
physician may, without articulating a reason, lawfully limit the extent and 
scope of his or her obligation to treat a patient by communicating this intent 
to the patient.123  Similarly, in most circumstances, a private hospital may 
also limit the procedures it offers to its patients.124  Physicians may have 
many reasons not to accept prospective patients into their care or to limit 
their practices to certain areas.  The most profound reason may be the phy-
sician’s exercise of conscience.125 
In sum, a general consensus recognizing the rights of physicians and 
hospitals to limit the treatments and procedures they provide has long 
existed.126  But, in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade,127 some began to question 
this right.  The underlying theory is that the right to abortion—or other 
legally permissible procedures or medications that might be subject to 
conscientious objection—becomes meaningless without physicians or phar-
macists who are willing to provide such services.128  In other words, a 
patient’s very ability to choose these procedures or medications is 
 
and their interests are pitted against the belief of the patient, we think it reasonable to resolve the 
problem by permitting the hospital and its staff to pursue their functions according to their 
professional standards”), overruled in part by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) 
(overruling Heston to the extent the court there attributed more weight to the physician’s 
professional creed than to the patient’s privacy rights; the Conroy court noted “[n]o right is held 
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual 
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, 
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law”). 
123. Giallanza v. Sands, 316 So. 2d 77, 83 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1975) (Walden, C.J., 
dissenting); Brandt v. Grubin, 329 A.2d 82, 88-89 (N.J. 1974); McNamara v. Emmons, 97 P.2d 
503, 507 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1939); Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1937); Childers v. 
Frye, 158 S.E. 744, 746 (N.C. 1931).  Of course, the relationship is a voluntary one—the same 
rule applies to creation and termination of the relationship. See supra note 38. 
124. See, e.g., Ham v. Holy Rosary Hosp., 529 P.2d 361, 367 (Mont. 1974) (upholding the 
hospital’s right to refuse to allow sterilization within its facility). 
125. The importance of conscience in American life has a long history, crucial to the 
founding of the country.  The powerful influence of respect for rights of conscience on the 
founders of the American Constitution is well documented. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The 
Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 354-72 (2002) 
(reviewing colonial history of protection of rights of conscience); Harrop A. Freeman, A 
Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806 (1958); Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams 
and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455 (1991); McConnell, supra note 
124; Aviam Soifer, Full and Equal Rights of Conscience, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 469 (2000).  James 
Madison spoke of the exercise of the conscience as a fundamental right of man. See Everson v. 
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
126. A duty commences upon formation of a physician-client relationship. See generally 
Majzoub v. Appling, 95 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App. 2002) (stating a physician who did not take an 
affirmative action to treat a patient in order to create a physician-patient relationship owed no duty 
to the patient). 
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a Constitutional right to privacy grounds a woman’s right 
to abortion services). See infra notes 185-188 and accompanying text. 
128. See, e.g., Lois Uttley & Ronnie Pawlko, No Strings Attached:  Public Funding of 
Religiously-Sponsored Hospitals in the United States, MERGERWATCH, 2002, at 47-48, available 
at http://www.mergerwatch.org/pdfs/bp_no_strings.pdf. 
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dependent upon the existence of a doctor who is willing to facilitate 
whatever choice the patient makes; this concern is especially keen in rural 
areas.129  Consequently, a physician’s unwillingness to act in a particular 
way due to his or her conscience becomes a barrier to a patient’s self-
realization. 
Some argue an underlying broad access theory essentially treats physi-
cians and care providers like a public utility, relegating the significance of 
moral feelings to the second tier.130  Most advocates do not go so far, 
however, suggesting a compromise of the competing interests.131  Regard-
less of a physician’s ethical beliefs, a patient is entitled to receive the infor-
mation necessary for informed consent.132  Some advocates go further, 
 
129. See, e.g., Susan A. Farrell, Reframing Social Justice, Feminism and Abortion, 
CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE (Spring 2005), http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/conscience/archives/ 
c2004spring_reframingsocialjustice.asp.  It is perhaps unnecessary to illustrate the intensity of 
emotion that abortion issues engender, but the following provides an example: 
The bishops use [the conscience clause] to insist that Catholic hospitals are exempt 
from federal guidelines to provide women and men with full reproductive ser-
vices . . . .  Who’s being discriminated against?  No word on women struggling to hold 
body and soul together as they try to raise families, deal with the possibility of health 
care problems and try to pay for their own and their children’s health care.  These 
religious leaders talk about the conscience rights of institutions, but are dismissive of 
Catholics who argue for the right of conscience when trying to make decisions about 
reproductive issues that affect their very lives.  Again, this is especially important for 
poor women.  If these hospitals exercise their conscience rights and are the only health 
care providers available in a given location, women may die. 
Id. 
130. While suggesting a compromise of competing interests is possible, Professor Wardle’s 
powerful rebuttal to an argument like Farrell’s illustrates the passions on the other side of the 
issue: 
[To] sacrifice individual religious principles and personal rights of conscience for an 
assumed expedient in patient autonomy undermine the moral basis for the very 
objective they seek to secure.  Such expediency impoverishes and demeans not only 
the individual health care providers specifically and the medical profession generally, 
but it weakens the very foundations of our constitutional order.  We cannot survive as 
a Constitutional republic without constantly protecting the rights of conscience of all 
citizens. 
Lynn D. Wardle, Protection for Rights of Conscience in American Law:  First Rights or Last 
Rites?, PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT (2006), http://www.consciencelaws.org/issues-
legal/legal031.html. 
131. Bassett, supra note 124, at 565 (“Hospitals’ ethical independence must be measured by 
the informed right and feasibility of choice of those contracting for their services,” suggesting that 
hospitals advertise their religious affiliation and availability of reproductive health services and 
refrain from monopolization); Swartz, supra note 124, at 334-35 (noting that proposed “compro-
mise tactics” to balance an institution’s religious beliefs with patient access to health care range 
from simply requiring a facility to fully disclose services available to an intermediate step of re-
quiring insurance coverage and referrals, or even “encouraging” objectors to consider shifting 
specialties); White, supra note 124, at 1742-45. 
132. In this circumstance, the issue is not whether the physician has firm views against a 
procedure and would refuse to perform it—for example, in a wrongful birth or abortion case—the 
issue is the patient’s right to receive information:  the negligence, then, is the failure to inform the 
parents of a possibly disabling condition of the fetus, availability of genetic testing, etc. See infra 
note 147. 
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arguing that because patient access to health care is the focus of “medical 
professionalism,” physician “devotion to health care values by placing the 
goals of individual and public health ahead of other goals”133 can be applied 
even in cases of conscientious objection.134 
In response to Roe v. Wade—and apparently to buttress the historical 
ability to practice medicine in accordance with one’s interests and con-
science—states and the federal government135 enacted statutes allowing 
health care providers to refuse to provide procedures to which they objected 
on moral or religious grounds.136  According to the often cited Guttmacher 
Institute, as of September 1, 2010, some type of conscience clause had been 
enacted in forty-six states.137  The North Dakota Legislative Assembly 
enacted a conscience clause enabling medical providers to refer elsewhere 
those patients who make end-of-life “health care decisions” regarding 
withdrawal of treatment.138  Regarding reproductive health decisions, North 
 
133. Matthew K. Wynia et al., Medical Professionalism in Society, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1612, 1612-13 (1999) (presenting the argument in the economic sphere—in the context of market 
competition and financial self-interest—that physicians must speak out in favor of patient rights 
even when this conflicts with personal beliefs). 
134. Swartz, supra note 124, at 346. 
135. Relying upon the Church Amendments, the Public Health Service Act, and the Weldon 
Amendment, the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) affirmed the 
right of federally-funded health care providers to decline to participate in services to which they 
object, such as abortion, in a final rule notice published in the Federal Register on December 19, 
2008. See 73 Fed. Reg. 78072 (Dec. 19, 2008).  The regulation was to become effective January 
20, 2009, but HHS components were given discretion to phase-in the regulation’s written 
certification requirement by October 1, 2009, the beginning of the 2010 federal fiscal year.  The 
Obama Administration may not be in agreement with the Bush Administration about this issue; 
HHS issued a notice proposing to rescind the December 19, 2008 final rule stating “it is important 
to have an opportunity to review this regulation to ensure its consistency with current Administra-
tion policy and to reevaluate the necessity for regulations implementing the Church Amendments, 
Section 245 of the Public Health Service Act, and the Weldon Amendment.” 74 Fed. Reg. 10207 
(March 10, 2009). 
136. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1994).  Enacted by ballot measure in 1994, 
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act was the country’s first law authorizing physician-assisted 
suicide. See id.  A specific conscience clause protected the right of refusal by physicians and 
pharmacists who prefer not to become involved in this process. Id.  The Act was upheld against 
the argument that physician-assisted suicide violated the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 801 (2006); the conscience provision was not in question. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 
243, 270-75 (2006).  Though many of these provisions apply only to certain procedures, such as 
abortion, in other cases the clauses potentially affect not merely abortion and other aspects of 
reproductive medicine, but end-of-life care, stem-cell-related technologies, and a host of other 
issues.  Medical ethics even impact state executions. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 66 (2008) 
(interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the U.S. 
Supreme Court commented on the conscience issue in executions, noting medical ethics precluded 
physician involvement, resulting in postponement of executions in California (citing Deborah W. 
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary:  How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 49 (2007))). 
137. State Policies in Brief, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www. 
guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf.  See also Wardle, supra note 124, at 179-99 
(describing and categorizing the various state conscience clauses). 
138. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.5-09(2), -12(3) (Supp. 2009). 
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Dakota limits its conscience clause protections on abortion:  “[N]o hospital, 
physician, nurse, hospital employee, nor any other person is under any duty 
[or] required to participate in the performance of an abortion, if such hospi-
tal or person objects to such abortion.  No such person or institution may be 
discriminated against because the person or institution so objects.”139 
Gradually, the exemptions expanded beyond physicians to include 
other individuals and entities involved in health care, such as nurses, coun-
selors, insurers, and hospitals.  Although some statutory refusal rights are 
predicated on exercise of a religious or moral conscience, others, like North 
Dakota’s, do not refer to religious or moral beliefs at all—though it seems 
safe to assume that moral beliefs ground most objections to participating in 
an abortion.  Predictably, litigation has followed, and while the complica-
tions are many, a few general “rules of the game” might be gleaned.  First, 
it appears the grounds for the medical professional’s objections are impor-
tant—in other words, whether the objections are based on moral or religious 
conscience or on personal ethics.  Closely related is the second generality—
that secular and religious institutions can be treated differently.  Third, the 
right of individuals to practice as they see fit might be broader than those of 
a medical facility. 
These generalities are derived by interpreting the particular statutory 
framework and from broad principles, including balancing the patient’s 
rights to autonomy with the medical practitioner’s right to engage his or her 
conscience.  In brief, the patient’s right to direct her own medical care 
generally requires a physician to remedy the knowledge gap between 
professional and patient by providing the patient with information necessary 
to make an informed decision about her health care.140  The principle that 
patients have a right to direct their medical care is quite broad and applies 
no less where the medical decision facing the patient is life-threatening.141 
 
139. Id. § 23-16-14. 
140. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.  The states are divided as to whether the 
standard for informed consent is a professional malpractice standard or a patient-oriented “rights” 
standard, but they agree patient autonomy is the central basis for the doctrine. See Ketchup v. 
Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 374, 381-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (providing, in the appendix, a summary 
of the other forty-nine state laws or judicial decisions on informed consent). 
141. End of life cases famously present the issue in stark terms. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990).  The general principle of patient autonomy also 
undergirds the so-called “wrongful birth” cases, where a physician is alleged to have negligently 
failed to diagnose a defect in the fetus or inform the parents of the need for genetic testing, thereby 
depriving the woman the option of terminating a pregnancy. See Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling 
Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 142-43 
(2005), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/crcl/vol40_1/hensel.pdf (stating 
more than half of the jurisdictions have recognized wrongful birth actions).  See also Willis v. Wu, 
607 S.E.2d 63, 65-66 (S.C. 2004) (discussing the difference between wrongful birth, wrongful 
life, and wrongful pregnancy actions). 
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First, conscience clauses appear to constitutionally balance a medical 
provider’s right to conscientious objection with patient autonomy, without 
running afoul of the First Amendment, which simultaneously prohibits the 
government from prohibiting the free exercise of religion and from estab-
lishing a religion.142  Some health care providers argue that requiring them 
to provide access to health services to which they have religious-based 
objections burdens their right to exercise their religion freely.143  Under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,144 it does not appear that conscience clauses 
violate the constitutional guarantee to free exercise of religion because such 
clauses cannot be used to challenge a neutral law of general applicability.145  
In other words, no matter how much a law burdens religious practices, it is 
constitutional so long as it does not single out religious behavior for 
punishment and is not motivated by a desire to interfere with religion.146 
While the Free Exercise Clause may not protect the rights of religious 
providers to refuse to provide health care services the government considers 
necessary to protect public health, neither does the Establishment Clause 
prohibit governments from enacting conscience clauses.  Though the 
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been 
 
142. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First 
Amendment applies to state governments due to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  The First Amendment 
applies to state actors; thus, employers are not precluded by the Constitution from engaging 
employees on the terms the public demands for its goods and services.  Of course, in addition to 
basic constitutional safeguards, various statutory schemes protect employees from discrimination 
that place an undue burden on their religious practices. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (2006) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against 
employees on the basis of religion).  Many states have similar state laws, but legislative accom-
modations that accord individuals or entities an exemption from state interference benefit religion 
and are scrutinized not under the Free Exercise Clause, but under the Establishment Clause.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the Constitution demands accommodation by the government 
in few instances—rather special exceptions for religious practices are generally a matter of 
legislative choice. See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (“It is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant govern-
mental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their 
religious missions.”); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 
(1987) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (“This Court has long recognized that the 
government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so 
without violating the Establishment Clause.”)). 
143. See Clark, supra note 124, at 649-65 (discussing Free Exercise jurisprudence). 
144. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
145. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874-90. 
146. Id. 
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characterized as “inconsistent and unprincipled,”147 the basic principle is 
that legislative accommodations to religion are reasonable and consistent 
with the Establishment Clause when they have a secular purpose and do not 
serve primarily to advance religion or foster an excessive entanglement 
with religion.148  In sum, it appears conscience clauses fit “in the room for 
play in the joints” between the clauses.149  Most conclude a conscience 
clause is neither constitutionally mandated by the Free Exercise Clause nor 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.150 
Regarding the first general “rule of the game” that the grounds for the 
objection are important, there seems to be little doubt the First Amendment 
encompasses the religious, as opposed to secular, expression of con-
science.151  Though not grounded in science, the First Amendment’s 
distinction between religious and secular conscience serves a purpose.  
Regarding conscience clauses, the distinction precludes allowing individual 
practitioners to use their own personal beliefs to determine whether they 
 
147. Stephen G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?:  Reconsidering the Accommodation of 
Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 75 (1990) 
(citation omitted). 
148. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 n.11 (1987) (noting the state’s award of unemployment bene-
fits to religious observers did not single out a class of persons for favorable treatment and did not 
endorse religion).  Of course, a provision—including a conscience clause—that benefits one 
religious group, and not others, may run afoul of this injunction. See, e.g., Children’s HealthCare 
is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Vladeck, 938 F.Supp. 1466, 1486-87 (D. Minn. 1996) (striking down a 
special exemption from a portion of the Medicare Act granted to Christian Science nursing homes 
in Minnesota). 
149. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (citation omitted). 
150. See, e.g., White, supra note 124, at 1729-30.  Conscience clauses do not violate a 
woman’s constitutional reproductive rights. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973) 
(“Further, a physician or any other employee has the right to refrain, for moral or religious 
reasons, from participating in the abortion procedure.  These provisions obviously are in the 
statute in order to afford appropriate protection to the individual and to the denominational 
hospital.”). 
151. See Feldman, supra note 129, at 413 (stating because “protection of dissenters’ liberty 
of conscience formed the motivating force behind the [Establishment] Clause, it follows that the 
Clause only prohibits government from action that coerces the consciences of religious 
dissenters”); Freeman, supra note 129, at 811-12 (arguing the ultimate dropping of the term 
“conscience” from the First Amendment resulted from later revisions that were revisions only of 
language, which all agreed carried out the intent to protect religious conscience); Hamburger, 
supra note 124, at 919-20 (arguing against an interpretation of the Free Exercise clause that 
exempts individuals from civil laws to which they have objections); McConnell, supra note 124, 
at 1495 (arguing the founders specifically intended to give religious conscience more constitu-
tional protection than rights of conscience generally); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of 
Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 12 (2000) (arguing the history of the writing of the 
First Amendment and the differing language used in the various drafts casts doubt on the 
suggestion of some commentators that the constitutional term “religion” should be broadly 
interpreted in order to encompass secular claims of conscience:  “[r]egardless of whether such a 
broad interpretation would be a good idea, such a step would constitute an amendment, not an 
interpretation, of the First Amendment, and one that the Framers specifically considered, debated, 
and ultimately rejected”). 
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will practice their profession, which could potentially create chaos for 
health care administration and patient care.152 
The general principle that a distinction exists between religious and 
secular conscience applies equally to medical facilities—our second related 
“rule of the game.”153  Examining a conscience objection law protecting 
private hospitals that have policies against performing abortions, the Alaska 
Supreme Court, in Valley Hospital Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coalition,154 seemed to 
find the distinction important, holding a quasi-public hospital could not 
utilize the state’s conscience clause to refuse to offer abortion services.155  
Although the hospital stated its policy “is a matter of conscience,” the court 
held the hospital “is not affiliated with any religion and cannot raise a free 
exercise claim.”156  The court determined the hospital’s policy to be a 
purely “statutory right” of refusal, while the right to procure an abortion is 
protected by the broad state constitutional right of privacy.157  Therefore, 
utilizing the theory medical providers are akin to a public utility, and con-
cluding the legislature “may not balance statutory rights against constitu-
tional ones,” the court struck down the conscience protection law.158  The 
court essentially held the right of privacy trumps the moral or ethical 
policies of the private hospital, relying on the fact the hospital was 
“organized to serve public interests.”159 
The Mat-Su case might have come out differently if the situation had 
instead involved an individual practitioner—applying our third “rule of the 
game,” that individuals are accorded more rights to exercise conscience 
than institutions.  The idea individuals have more conscientious objection 
 
152. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1980). In Thomas v. Review 
Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, the Court held that “[o]nly beliefs rooted in 
religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to 
the exercise of religion.” 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).  Jurists and scholars have grappled with the 
difficulty of distinguishing between religious and other beliefs, but “[a] purely rational, philo-
sophical ethical system, regardless of how moral and central to a person’s life would appear not to 
meet the definition” of religion under the Free Exercise Clause. Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating 
Religion at Work:  A Principled Approach to Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 719, 751 (1996). 
153. Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1356 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (holding that 
Minnesota’s conscience clause allowing any “hospital or institution” to refuse to perform abor-
tions could not constitutionally apply to public hospitals); Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, 366 
A.2d 641, 647 (N.J. 1976) (holding that although, on its face, the state’s conscience clause applied 
to all hospitals, the clause did not protect nonsectarian non-profit hospitals). 
154. 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). 
155. Valley Hosp. Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 972. 
156. Id. at 972 n.20. 
157. Id. at 968 (concluding the Alaska Constitution’s fundamental right of privacy “provides 
more protection of individual privacy rights than the United States Constitution”). 
158. Id. at 972. 
159. Id. at 970-71. 
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rights than institutions stems from a common sense observation that organi-
zations, though composed of individuals with consciences, might recruit 
people of different sensibilities.  Moreover, context is relevant regarding the 
greater protections afforded to individuals.  Most cases in which courts 
have upheld the refusal rights of individuals have involved health care 
professionals who have been discharged or demoted from their employment 
due to their refusal to participate in a procedure such as abortion.  These 
plaintiffs are easily characterized in a sympathetic light, as victims of 
religious discrimination.  A number of legal theories might be invoked 
against an employer taking such disciplinary action, such as under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,160 which requires employers to accom-
modate the religious beliefs of their employees unless such accommodation 
results in an undue hardship to the employer.161 
The outcome may be different if the complaining party is a patient 
injured due to the health care professional’s refusal to provide care.  For 
example, in a straight-forward analysis, a Wisconsin Appeals Court rejected 
the First Amendment “right to conscience” as a defense in a disciplinary 
proceeding against a pharmacist alleged to have violated the standard of 
care when he refused to fill or transfer a patient’s prescription for an oral 
contraceptive.162  The court noted the ordinary standard of care for a phar-
macist who exercises a conscientious objection to the dispensing of a 
prescription simply requires him to “ensure that there is an alternative 
 
160. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
161. See, e.g., Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 225-28 (3d Cir. 
2000) (finding a hospital not liable to a nurse under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
because the hospital had attempted to accommodate the nurse’s religious-based objections).  Most 
such employment cases seem to be brought in state courts. See, e.g., Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of 
Miami, Fla., Inc., 400 So.2d 1262, 1263, 1266-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting the trial 
court’s finding the employer’s demotion decision was based on a fiscal necessity, and applying a 
federal Title VII analysis to Florida’s civil rights statute, the court concluded that accommodating 
the nurse would not have created an undue hardship for the clinic; thus, the nurse was entitled to 
reinstatement). 
162. Noesen v. State Dep’t of Regulation & Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Bd., 751 
N.W.2d 385, 390 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2008).  The court further noted licensing statutes are enacted for 
the benefit of the public, not the practitioner, and concluded the Administrative Law Judge had not 
erred in finding the pharmacist had “engaged in practice which constitutes a danger to the health, 
welfare, or safety of a patient and has practiced in a manner which substantially departs from the 
standard of care ordinarily exercised by a pharmacist and which harmed or could have harmed a 
patient, in violation of [Wisconsin Administrative Code] § Phar 10.03(2).” Id.  The issue arose 
previously in an employment law case as an unpublished opinion, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit rejected the same pharmacist’s claim that his firing violated Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act—which requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for its 
employees’ religious beliefs and practices—because it would result in undue hardship to the 
employer. Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x 581, 584 (7th Cir. 2007).  The 
employee did not help himself; he believed the employer could reasonably accommodate his 
demand to avoid any contact with customers who asked to have prescriptions for birth control 
filled, refusing even to transfer a call. Id. at 583. 
       
2010] MINOR CONSENT 97 
mechanism for the patient to receive his or her medication, including in-
forming the patient of their options to obtain their prescription,” and inform 
his employer he would not transfer the prescription.163  By failing to do 
either, the pharmacist departed from the ordinary standard of care, which 
could have harmed the patient.164  After noting “the State has a compelling 
interest in public health and safety, and that this interest includes ensuring 
legally prescribed drugs are not improperly withheld from those for whom 
they have been prescribed,”165 the court held the pharmacist had not shown 
his First Amendment right “was burdened by the application of a standard 
of care.”166  In this case, a more prudent approach—transferring the pa-
tient’s prescription request to another pharmacist—might have saved the 
practitioner’s right to practice according to conscience; the pharmacist had 
simply not shown the statutory requirements burdened his First Amendment 
rights.167 
Finally, conscience clauses may not protect a medical professional if 
the exercise of conscience conflicts with other laws.  For example, in a 
California case garnering national attention, a patient sued a physicians’ 
group for violating state anti-discrimination laws due to a physician’s re-
fusal to artificially inseminate her because she was involved in a lesbian 
relationship.168  While the physician agreed to treat the patient for infer-
tility, the physician clearly stated from the outset she was unwilling to arti-
ficially inseminate the patient because of “religious beliefs.”169  The patient 
concurred with this plan, and the treatment began.170  Nonetheless, the 
patient sued, alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.171  
 
163. Noesen, 751 N.W.2d at 389-90. 
164. Id. at 391-92. 
165. Id. at 393 n.6 (the defendant pharmacist “concedes that the State has a compelling 
interest in public health and safety, and that this interest includes ensuring that legally prescribed 
drugs are not improperly withheld from those for whom they have been prescribed”). 
166. Id. at 393. The court noted “[t]he Wisconsin Constitution offers more expansive 
protections for freedom of conscience than those offered by the First Amendment.” Id. at 392.  
Under Wisconsin precedent: 
The challenger must prove (1) that he or she has a sincerely held religious belief, (2) 
that is burdened by application of the state law at issue.  Upon such a showing, the 
burden shifts to the state to prove (3) that the law is based in a compelling state 
interest, (4) which cannot be served by a less restrictive alternative. 
Id.  Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has “never held that an individual’s religious 
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State 
is free to regulate.” Id. at 393 (citation omitted). 
167. Id. at 393. 
168. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 
959, 963 (Cal. 2008). 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 964-65. 
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The physician claimed her rights under the First Amendment, and the corre-
sponding California provision,172 exempted her from compliance with the 
antidiscrimination provisions of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act,173 
which prohibits discrimination based on a person’s sexual orientation.174  
Citing federal precedent, the court held “the First Amendment’s right to the 
free exercise of religion does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground 
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes 
(or proscribes).”175  Thus, the case was remanded for trial.176  It does not 
appear that adding a statutory right of refusal through enactment of a con-
science clause would alter this result. 
Thus, just as there is a tension between affording confidentiality to the 
minor patient and parental rights, there is a tension between providing 
reproductive services demanded by the public and a medical professional’s 
exercise of personal conscience.  Senate Bill 2394 does not alter the argu-
ments and issues that stem from North Dakota’s conscience clause relating 
to abortion. 
VII. MINORS AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW 
AND CONSTITUTION 
Most of the legislative and court activity regarding minor consent to 
treatment involves reproductive rights.  A majority of states have enacted 
legislation affording minors the right to consent to reproductive services.177  
While some states have invalidated parental notice statutes on state consti-
tutional grounds,178 this avenue is less promising in North Dakota because 
 
172. Id. at 966-69.  The relevant section of California’s Constitution provides, “Free exercise 
and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed.” CAL. CONST. art. 
I, § 4. 
173. North Coast, 189 P.3d at 968 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering 2005 & Supp. 
2010)). 
174. Id. at 965. 
175. Id. at 966 (citing Emp’t Div., Ore. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 
(1990); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (“a law that is 
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest 
even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”).  Thus, the 
court concluded, “under the United States Supreme Court’s most recent holdings, a religious 
objector has no federal constitutional right to an exemption from a neutral and valid law of 
general applicability on the ground that compliance with that law is contrary to the objector’s 
religious beliefs.” North Coast, 189 P.3d at 966. 
176. Id. at 970. 
177. See generally DALE ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.02(c)(i) (discussing minor consent); 
ROZOVSKY, supra note 12, § 5.02, 5.03 (discussing minor consent). 
178. This argument has the most strength when the state constitution recognizes a right to 
privacy; ten states have such provisions. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, 
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the legislature and North Dakota Supreme Court take a paternalistic view in 
resolving a potential conflict between parental rights and a minor’s privacy 
rights.179  Therefore, this section of the article primarily discusses a minor’s 
 
§§ 6, 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 7.  California and Florida courts have cited the explicit recognition of the right to 
privacy as grounds for protecting a minor’s right to consent. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. 
Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 807-08 (Cal. 1997) (noting the California Constitution contains an explicit 
guarantee to the right of privacy, the court struck down as unconstitutional California’s parental 
consent law, which prohibits abortions for minors without either the consent of one parent or 
judicial authorization, concluding the judicial bypass did not save the law); Am. Acad. of 
Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 53-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (enjoining enforcement 
of California’s statute imposing criminal penalties upon persons performing abortions on uneman-
cipated minors without parental consent, based on the state constitutional right to privacy); N. Fla. 
Women’s Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 619-21 (Fla. 2003) (noting 
the state constitution includes an independent “freestanding Right of Privacy Clause” that protects 
minors as well as adults, holding the Parental Consent Act imposed a significant restriction on this 
right, and concluding the state failed to prove the Parental Consent Act furthered a “compelling 
State interest”).  Tennessee has done so under a more general theory. See Davis v. Davis, 842 
S.W.2d 588, 600-01 (Tenn. 1992) (holding, under the Tennessee Constitution, the right of pro-
creation is “a vital part of an individual’s right to privacy,” and “a right to procreational autonomy 
is inherent in our most basic concepts of liberty,” which had previously been applied to minors in 
decisions involving abortion) (citations omitted).  Alaska has also taken a broad view of its state’s 
constitutional right to privacy, held by the Alaska Supreme Court to provide more protection than 
its federal counterpart. See Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 967-68 
(Alaska 1997).  Montana also appears to be a likely candidate to extend privacy rights to minors 
insofar as they make decisions relating to procreation; Montana’s Supreme Court noted, “Montana 
adheres to one of the most stringent protections of its citizens’ right to privacy in the United 
States—exceeding even that provided by the federal constitution.” Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 
364, 373-74 (Mont. 1999). 
179. The tension between a minor’s privacy rights and parental rights in determining which 
party has the right to consent to the minor’s medical care is undeniable.  As noted above, the 
North Dakota legislature twice defeated minor consent legislation for pregnancy-related care. See 
supra note 3 and accompanying text.  Additionally, in contrast to little or no discussion about 
minor privacy rights, the North Dakota Supreme Court has eloquently expounded the importance 
of parental rights, stating: 
The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed essential, basic 
civil rights of man, and rights far more precious than property rights.  It is cardinal 
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose 
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor hinder.  The Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against 
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests including 
the right to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children.  Choices about mar-
riage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights 
sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, 
disregard, or disrespect.  Absent a powerful countervailing interest, a parent’s desire 
for and right to the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her 
children is an important interest that warrants deference and protection.  The history 
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the 
nature and upbringing of their children.  This primary role of the parents in the up-
bringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition.  The liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution includes the right of the individual to marry, establish a home and bring 
up children, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, ¶ 8, 595 N.W.2d 285, 288 (citations and internal punctuation 
omitted).  The North Dakota Supreme Court has “often recognized that our North Dakota 
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rights under the United States Constitution.180  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
stated, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the indivi-
dual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child.”181  Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the 
Constitution,182 including the constitutional right to privacy in connection 
with decisions relating to procreation.183  Accordingly, legislative enact-
ments are interpreted in light of this crucial constitutional interest. 
In brief, although the courts reason the right of privacy regarding this 
most intimate and essential matter must extend to minors,184 states may 
treat minors differently from adults.185  First, states have a “strong and 
legitimate interest” in the welfare of its youth, whose immaturity, inexperi-
ence, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise 
their rights fully.186  Thus, there is “little doubt” the state has a legitimate 
interest in encouraging an unmarried minor to seek parental assistance and 
 
Constitution may afford broader rights than those granted under an equivalent provision of the 
federal constitution.” In re K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 563 (N.D. 1993).  Additionally, the court has 
noted “it is within our power to apply higher constitutional standards than are required of the 
States by the Federal Constitution.” State v. Klodt, 298 N.W.2d 783, 786 (N.D. 1980).  However, 
other than the protection accorded against unreasonable searches and seizures, provided in article 
I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution, “no statutory or constitutional right of privacy . . . 
has as yet been recognized under the North Dakota Constitution.” City of Grand Forks v. Grand 
Forks Herald, Inc., 307 N.W.2d 572, 579 (N.D. 1981).  
180. Under the U.S. Constitution, the right to privacy stems from the concept of liberty 
bestowed by the Fourteenth Amendment:  “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
held “the concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental,” such as the right 
to privacy, “and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights.” Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).  Included in the federal right to 
privacy is the right of reproductive freedom. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
181. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 
U.S. at 453). 
182. Id. at 692. 
183. Id. at 693-94 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 
(1976)). 
184. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (citing Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 
443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979)). In Bellotti II, the Court stated: 
[T]he potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, is not mitigated by her 
minority.  Indeed, considering her probable education, employment skills, financial 
resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally bur-
densome for a minor.  In addition, the fact of having a child brings with it adult legal 
responsibility, for parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the 
traditional criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority.  In sum, 
there are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important 
decision will have consequences so grave and indelible. 
Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642 (citation omitted). 
185. See generally ROZOVSKY, supra note 12, § 5.03(B)(1) (discussing the right to 
contraceptives). 
186. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 434 (citing Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 634-39). 
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guidance in making crucial decisions involving procreation.187  As a coun-
terpart to the responsibilities they have assumed, “[p]arents have an interest 
in controlling the education and upbringing of their children.”188  Though 
“biological parentage generally offers a person only an opportunity . . . to 
develop a relationship with his offspring,” the “demonstration of commit-
ment to the child through the assumption of personal, financial, or custodial 
responsibility may give the natural parent a stake in the relationship with 
the child rising to the level of a liberty interest.”189  “The family has a 
privacy interest in the upbringing and education of children . . . which is 
protected by the Constitution against undue state interference.”190  Unlike 
legislation affecting adults, in which a state must show a compelling state 
interest to regulate matters that touch upon the right to privacy,191 laws 
restricting a minor’s right of privacy must demonstrate only a “significant 
state interest.”192 
 
187. Id. at 445 (citation omitted). 
188. Id. (citations omitted). 
189. Id. at 446 (citations omitted). 
190. Id. (citations omitted). 
191. For example, many states have enacted legislation imposing ultrasound requirements, 
“abortion counseling,” waiting periods, and the like. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d 
(2008). See generally Emily Bazelon, Required Viewing:  Oklahoma’s Gallingly Paternalistic 
Ultrasound Law, SLATE (Oct. 22, 2008, 6:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2202765/.  The 
Guttmacher Institute has compiled a list of states that require counseling and/or waiting periods 
before an abortion may be performed.  See State Policies in Brief:  Counseling and Waiting 
Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/ 
statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf.  North Dakota’s 2009 Legislative Assembly amended 
N.D.C.C. section 14-02.1-04, creating a new subsection, that provides: 
An abortion facility may not perform an abortion on a woman without first offering 
the woman an opportunity to receive and view at the abortion facility or another 
facility an active ultrasound of her fetus.  The offer and opportunity to receive and 
view an ultrasound must occur at least twenty-four hours before the abortion is 
scheduled to be performed.  The active ultrasound image must be of a quality con-
sistent with standard medical practice in the community, contain the dimensions of the 
fetus, and accurately portray the presence of external members and internal organs, 
including the heartbeat, if present or viewable, of the fetus.  The auscultation of the 
fetal heart tone must be of a quality consistent with standard medical practice in the 
community.  The abortion facility shall document the woman’s response to the offer, 
including the date and time of the offer and the woman’s signature attesting to her 
informed decision. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(4) (2009).  In a recent opinion, Judge Herman ruled the ultra-
sound requirement simply requires the facility providing abortion services to provide information 
about where a pregnant woman can receive the ultrasound and does not require it to purchase the 
equipment and itself offer the service. MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, No. 09-09-C-02839 (Cass 
Co. Dist. Ct. N.D., August 11, 2009).  Moreover, the statute does not require a woman to view an 
ultrasound and listen to the fetal heartbeat, but is intended to provide her with more information. 
Id.  Thus, the statute does not place an undue burden on a woman’s constitutional rights. Id. 
192. Carey v. Population Svcs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (“State restrictions inhibiting 
privacy rights of minors are valid only if they serve ‘any significant state interest . . . that is not 
present in the case of an adult.’” (citation omitted)). 
       
102 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:63 
A. STD’S AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
Minors are most likely to request medical confidentiality regarding pri-
vate matters, such as sex or mental health matters, including substance 
abuse.  In this regard, North Dakota law provides that any person fourteen 
years of age or older “may contract for and receive examination, care, or 
treatment for sexually transmitted disease, alcoholism, or drug abuse with-
out permission, authority, or consent of a parent or guardian.”193  Most 
states allow minors to consent to such treatment on the theory that minors 
might not otherwise seek treatment.194  Moreover, many states have enacted 
laws protecting minor confidentiality when they seek a wide variety of 
other mental health services.195 
B. CONTRACEPTIVES 
The general constitutional issues regarding provision of contraceptives 
and abortion are similar.  North Dakota, however, has a detailed scheme 
governing parental notification in cases where minors seek an abortion.  
Yet, the state does not specifically address a minor’s ability to consent in 
the case of contraceptives. 
1. Parental Consent 
North Dakota is in the minority, as most states have enacted specific 
legislation governing minors’ rights to access contraceptives.196  Accord-
ingly, the general parental consent requirements under N.D.C.C. section 23-
12-13 apply, tempered by constitutional considerations.  In Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International,197 the United States Supreme Court held that 
although the Constitution does not protect a fundamental right of access to 
contraceptives, it does protect individual decisions in matters of child-
bearing from unjustified intrusion by the state.198  The Carey Court struck 
down as unconstitutional a New York scheme that only permitted distribu-
tion of contraceptives to minors in the case of medical necessity because the 
law impermissibly “burden[ed] the right to decide whether to bear 
 
193. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-17 (2009). 
194. See ROZOVSKY, supra note 12, § 5.04, at 5-58 to 5-60. 
195. See id. § 5.05, at 5-60 to 5-76.6. 
196. See ROZOVSKY, supra note 12, § 5.03(B)(3), at 5-36.2 (discussing contraceptive 
legislation for minors); Danielle M. Costello, The Right to Make Informed Reproductive-Health-
Care Decisions Regardless of Age:  Maintaining the Focus on the “I” in “I Want to be One Less,” 
8 WISC. L. REV. 987, 1000 (2008) (noting that twenty-one states and the District of Columbia 
explicitly allow minors to consent to contraceptive services without parental notification). 
197. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).  
198. Carey, 431 U.S. at 687-89. 
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children.”199  Citing its Danforth decision, which recognized the state does 
not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute veto 
over an abortion, the Carey Court held a blanket provision requiring the 
consent of parents as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor 
unconstitutional: 
Since the State may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a 
blanket requirement of parental consent, on the choice of a minor 
to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket pro-
hibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is a fortiori 
foreclosed.  The State’s interest in protection of the mental and 
physical health of the pregnant minor, and in protection of po-
tential life are clearly more implicated by the abortion decision 
than by the decision to use a nonhazardous contraceptive.200 
An individual’s right of privacy does not preclude all state limitations.  
To reiterate, states may impose more stringent requirements on minors than 
adults; in the case of adults, the state interest must be compelling, and in the 
case of minors, the state interest must be significant.  The Carey Court 
found no significant state interest because there “was no medical necessity 
[asserted by the state] for imposing a medical limitation on the distribution 
of nonprescription contraceptives to minors.”201  The Court barred delega-
tion of the state’s authority to disapprove of minors’ sexual behavior to 
physicians “who may exercise it arbitrarily, either to deny contraceptives to 
young people, or to undermine the State’s policy of discouraging illicit 
early sexual behavior.”202  The Court noted there are no medical judgments 
involved in the physician’s decision about contraceptives, only “moral 
counseling that can reflect little other than their private views on the mo-
rality of premarital sex among the young.”203  Carey appears to require a 
judicial bypass mechanism for minors “sufficiently mature and well-
informed” to access contraceptives based on their own consent, but it 
doesn’t address the issue regarding parental notice. 
2. Parental Notification 
Although courts appear to prohibit blanket prohibitions on minor 
access to contraceptives—judicial bypass of parental consent requirements 
 
199. Id. at 697.  
200. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).  In the matter of contraception, state interests to be served 
by parental notification are not as strong in the abortion issue; nevertheless, narrowly drawn notice 
provisions are generally upheld. ROZOVSKY, supra note 12, § 5.03(B)(2). 
201. Carey, 431 U.S. at 697. 
202. Id. at 699. 
203. Id. at 699 n.24. 
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must be available—there is no clear rule regarding the closely-related issue 
of parental notification.  Arguably, when minors are treated as though they 
were adults for purposes of consent, there should be no disclosure to 
parents.  Confidentiality of care is a basic ethical precept and essential to 
the physician-patient relationship; in the absence of statutory authority, it 
should not be abridged.204 
Parental notification without the minor’s consent creates ethical and 
constitutional dilemmas.  A minor’s right to privacy and the ethical issue of 
patient confidentiality, which is essential to a bond between physician and 
patient, are in tension with parental rights and policy arguments that favor 
parental notification.  Parental involvement is normally beneficial to the 
minor because it ensures both that the parents have an opportunity to pro-
vide the physician with the minor’s medical history and that minors receive 
appropriate follow-up care.205 
In the case of contraceptives, North Dakota law does not provide an 
answer to the dilemma; physicians must simultaneously balance protecting 
confidentiality and fostering the physician-patient relationship with con-
cerns for the patient’s health—that is, the benefit to a minor patient’s health 
is normally enhanced by parental involvement.  Although the courts have 
noted that in the matter of contraceptives, the state interests to be served by 
requiring parental notification are not as strong as in the case of abortion,206 
the legislature’s resolution of this issue in the context of an abortion may 
provide useful guidance regarding the physician’s obligation to safeguard 
the minor’s privacy rights when providing contraceptives or prenatal care.  
In the case of abortion, North Dakota law207 allows a minor to bypass 
parental notice and consent requirements, provided that she establishes to 
the court’s satisfaction that:  (1) she is sufficiently mature and well-
informed to make her decision without parental advice and counsel; or (2) 
notwithstanding that the minor is immature or uninformed, the best interests 
of the minor require confidentiality.208 
A 2007 case, Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, Department of Public 
Health,209 provides insight into the general issue surrounding a minor’s 
access to contraceptives, but from the perspective of the parent’s constitu-
tional rights.210  A sixteen-year-old, having recently engaged in sexual 
 
204. ROZOVSKY, supra note 12, § 5.02(A)(4), at 5-20.1. 
205. Id. §§ 5.02(A)(4), 5.03(B)(2), at 5-20.1, 5-36.1. 
206. Carey, 431 U.S. at 694. 
207. See N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(2), (5) (2009). 
208. Id. 
209. 503 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2007). 
210. Anspach, 503 F.3d at 262-65. 
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intercourse, feared she might be pregnant.211  The minor consulted a 
medical center and requested a pregnancy test.212  After being advised preg-
nancy tests were not being administered that day, she left the facility.213  
She returned shortly thereafter, having been prompted by a friend to ask for 
the morning-after pill.214  She spoke with a social worker and a registered 
nurse about the medication that could prevent pregnancy, and she took the 
medication as directed.215  The minor became ill after the second dose and 
was taken by her father to the emergency room of a nearby hospital.216 
The parents and minor subsequently filed a lawsuit, asserting a number 
of claims under state and federal law.217  The trial court dismissed the 
federal claims, concluding the parents did not have a constitutional right to 
notification of a minor’s exercise of her reproductive privacy rights.218  
Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects 
the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, 
custody, and control of their children,” the right is not absolute.219  Parental 
interests must be balanced with the child’s right to privacy.  Moreover, 
“Courts have recognized the parental liberty interest only where the 
behavior of the state actor compelled interference in the parent-child 
relationship.”220 
The parents also argued Pennsylvania law prohibits minors from con-
senting to any form of treatment unspecified in the Act.221  The court noted 
this argument “ignores the well-accepted principle that duties under state 
law cannot create constitutional rights[,]” thus, state “statutes remain 
subject to constitutional limitations, including the minor’s own privacy 
rights as well as the state’s legitimate interest in the reproductive health of 
minors.”222  Furthermore, even if such a claim were valid, the plaintiffs had 
misconstrued state law because the state’s Minor’s Consent Act “speci-
fically permits minors to ‘give effective consent for medical and health 
services to determine the presence of or treat pregnancy . . . and the consent 
 





216. Id. at 259-60. 
217. Id. at 260. 
218. Id. at 262-64.  
219. Id. at 262 (citations omitted). 
220. Id.  The court noted, “The real problem alleged by Plaintiffs is not that the state actors 
interfered with the Anspachs as parents; rather, it is that the state actors did not assist the 
Anspachs as parents or affirmatively foster the parent/child relationship.” Id. at 266. 
221. Id. at 269. 
222. Id. 
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of no other person shall be necessary.’”223  The Anspach court distinguished 
U.S. Supreme Court rulings with respect to notification and abortion, 
rejecting the claim that parental consent is required unless a court allows 
the minor to “bypass” the parents.224  First, the court noted those cases 
“concern the constitutional limitations on a state to interfere with a minor’s 
right to abortion, rather than a parent’s affirmative right to be apprised of a 
minor’s reproductive decisions generally.”225  Second, the Anspach court 
said the case law did not create a constitutional right of parental notification 
about an abortion, or any other reproductive health decision, but “merely 
find[s] such notification constitutionally permissible when paired with a 
judicial bypass provision to protect the minor’s health and safety.”226 
The courts, however, have not directly addressed what may be a 
plausible state interest in requiring parental notification.  Professor 
Rozovsky argues notification of the parents is medically necessary to obtain 
a good medical history from the parents: 
Perhaps the most interesting medicolegal argument that would 
have significant weight is the opportunity for parents to provide 
the minor’s physician with essential medical and related infor-
mation.  A minor may not be fully aware of a familial history that 
makes certain contraceptive medication contraindicated and dan-
gerous.  The minor may also have emotional difficulties about 
which the physician is not aware.  Without these types of informa-
tion the physician may treat a patient without the proper back-
ground necessary to recommend a specific form of contraception.  
This dilemma underlines the tension between the minor’s right of 
privacy and the physician’s need for sufficient information.  If a 
minor subsequently suffered an injury due to prescribed contra-
ceptive medication, the physician might be sued for negligent 
treatment.  Such a lawsuit could be successful if the physician had 
failed to obtain sufficient information on which to base treatment. 
The fact that the physician respected the minor’s right of privacy 
and did not contact her parents for further information would not 
be an adequate defense.  The right of privacy has nothing to do 
with an appropriate medical standard of care in the circumstances.  
When physicians are faced with minor patients about whom they 
do not have sufficient information, they should refrain from 
 
223. Id. (citing 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10103 (1970)). 
224. Id. at 270. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
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dispensing contraceptives known to have dangerous side effects or 
risks.  If a minor is unable to provide the necessary background 
information, a physician should obtain it from the patient’s guard-
ian or parents.  Absent statutory law to the contrary, a physician 
should first seek a minor’s consent to consult with her parents.  
Should the minor refuse permission, the physician should withhold 
prescribing any medication, turning instead to other contraceptive 
methods.  The minor’s reluctance to involve her parents and the 
physician’s respect for the patient’s constitutional right of privacy 
do not justify a departure from accepted standards of practice.227 
In sum, a blanket prohibition on the ability of a minor to provide legal 
consent to obtain contraceptives without judicial bypass is not likely to pass 
a constitutional challenge.  Additionally, it is clear parental notification 
statutes are permissible if they provide the appropriate judicial bypass based 
upon recognized exceptions for a minor’s maturity level or best interests.228  
Finally, Rozovsky’s argument that medical necessity justifies obtaining the 
minor’s, and potentially familial, medical history from the parents sets out a 
significant state interest that might justify parental notification statutes even 
without judicial bypass.229 
3. Minor Consent under Federal Law—Family Planning 
Services Act Title X 
As physicians practicing in this area are aware, there is a line of 
cases—including in the Eighth Circuit—establishing state parental consent 
requirements may not be applied to family planning services provided with 
funds under Title X of the federal Public Health Service Act, which pre-
empts state law.230  Addressing the concern of physicians that common law 
tort principles would subject the physician to liability for providing family 
planning services without parental consent, a federal court said: 
 
227. ROZOVSKY, supra note 12, § 5.03(B)(2), at 5-36.2 (emphasis added). 
228. For example, in Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Matheson, a federal district court 
invalidated a state law requiring, in all cases, parental notification prior to a minor’s receiving 
contraceptives. 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (D. Utah 1983).  The court indicated the Utah law failed 
because it did not provide a mechanism for mature minors, or one for immature minors for whom 
parental notification was not in their best interests, to obtain contraceptives confidentially. Id. 
229. Because the courts have not yet determined whether judicial bypass is required for 
mature minors in abortion cases, the case of contraceptives is even more difficult to predict.  This 
difficulty, of course, flows from the observation that states have a greater interest in regulating 
abortion than they do in regulating contraceptives. 
230. County of St. Charles, Mo. v. Mo. Family Health Council, 107 F.3d 682, 683 (8th Cir. 
1997); see generally Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Utah 1983); Doe v. 
Pickett, 480 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. W. Va. 1979); T.H. v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975). 
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[T]he reluctance of a physician or other service provider [to pro-
vide family planning services in the absence of parental consent] is 
misplaced.  There can be no imposition of common law tort lia-
bility and especially when the relationship between a physician 
and a minor patient is protected as a constitutional privacy right.231 
C. ABORTION:  NOTICE AND CONSENT REQUIREMENTS 
The constitutional arguments relating to contraceptives are also largely 
applicable to abortion.  North Dakota’s Abortion Control Act (ACA)232 was 
enacted in light of constitutional norms imposed by the courts.  The ACA, 
therefore, answers the questions regarding parental notification.  Senate Bill 
2394 is not an “abortion bill” and does not supplement or alter the physi-
cian’s obligations under the Act to seek parental consent—which obviously 
means the parents have notice—or ascertain that the minor has obtained an 
order from the juvenile court for an abortion.  The North Dakota Medical 
Association has long opined the physician’s obligation to follow the proce-
dures in the ACA extends to the situation where a prescription for contra-
ceptives terminates pregnancy, rather than prevents pregnancy.233 
North Dakota law provides a court may authorize an abortion without 
parental notice or consent if the minor is both “sufficiently mature” and 
“well-informed with regard to the nature, effects, and possible conse-
quences of both having an abortion and bearing her child . . . .”234  The law 
governing provision of abortion services is complex, requiring resolution of 
the potential conflict between the minor’s privacy rights and the parent’s 
 
231. Doe, 480 F. Supp. at 1223. 
232. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-02.1 (2009). 
233. Letter from Bruce Levi, Exec. Dir., N.D. Med. Ass’n, to Dr. Robert E. Grossman, W. 
River Health Clinics (May 23, 1997) (on file with the N.D. Med. Ass’n); Letter from Murray 
Sagsveen to Vernon E. Wagner (Nov. 26, 1991).  This conclusion follows from the broad defini-
tion of abortion, which North Dakota defines as “the termination of human pregnancy with an 
intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead embryo or fetus.” § 14-02.1-02(1).  
But courts may not give such a broad reading to the statutory definition.  In 1994, plaintiffs chal-
lenged the definition of “abortion” as unconstitutionally void for vagueness, arguing the definition 
would subject certain medical procedures such as amniocentesis to the abortion law because those 
procedures could result in termination of the pregnancy as a consequence. Fargo Women’s Health 
Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 535-36 (8th Cir. 1994).  The court rejected the argument as “unduly 
strained,” taking instead a “common sense interpretation” of the statute, concluding that “physi-
cians are fully capable of understanding the . . . [law’s] requirements and prohibitions.” Id. at 535.  
While the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the term “abortion” in Fargo Women’s Health seems 
to indicate courts may construe that definition narrowly, the scope of the definition and its appli-
cation to birth control medication or devices is not fully resolved.  Because the Abortion Control 
Act provides both criminal and civil penalties for performance of an abortion without informed 
consent—including $10,000 in punitive damages and treble actual damages—a prudent physician 
must be aware of the potential a birth control medication, or device that terminates pregnancy, 
may meet the definition of “abortion” in chapter 14-02.1. See § 14-02.1-03.2. 
234. § 14-02.1-03.1(2)(a). 
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constitutional right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their children.  These competing interests and concerns are the 
genesis for the proposition that states must create a judicial bypass mecha-
nism to parental consent; indeed, much of the litigation concerning a 
minor’s rights and abortion relate to the sufficiency of the bypass. 
For a parental consent statute to be constitutional it must contain a 
bypass procedure that meets four criteria; it must: 
(1) allow the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she estab-
lishes that she is mature enough and well enough informed to 
make the abortion decision independently; (2) allow the minor to 
bypass the consent requirement if she establishes that the abortion 
would be in her best interests; (3) ensure the minor’s anonymity; 
and (4) provide for expeditious bypass procedures.235 
In contrast to parental consent requirements, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has upheld a parental notification statute, but the Court limited its holding 
to the particular circumstance of a minor: (a) living with and dependent 
upon her parents; (b) not emancipated by marriage or otherwise; and, (c) 
who made no claim or showing as to her maturity or as to her relations with 
her parents.236  The Court noted it could not assume that parental notifica-
tion statutes, when applied to mature minors, would be constitutionally 
sound.237  In Hodgson v. Minnesota,238 a five justice majority held 
Minnesota’s two-parent notice requirement, without judicial bypass, was 
unconstitutional.239  But, a different five justice majority, with Justice 
O’Connor joining the majority in each instance, found the constitutional 
infirmities were eliminated by the statutory inclusion of a judicial bypass 
procedure.240 
In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,241 the U.S. Supreme 
Court reviewed an Ohio statute that made it a crime for a physician to 
perform an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated minor, except where 
there was actual notice to one of the minor’s parents or guardians or where 
the abortion was done in compliance with a judicial bypass procedure.242  
The Court focused on the adequacy of Ohio’s judicial bypass procedure and 
 
235. Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997) (citing Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 
(1979)); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 511-13 (1990). 
236. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407 (1981). 
237. Id. at 406-07. 
238. 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
239. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 437-58. 
240. Id. at 458-61. 
241. 497 U.S. 502 (1990). 
242. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 507-08. 
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reiterated its earlier holdings requiring a judicial bypass procedure for 
parental consent statutes but left open the question of whether due process 
requires parental notice statutes to contain judicial bypass procedures.243  
Regarding the sufficiency of such judicial bypass to parental notice, it may 
be enough to note it is a corollary to the greater intrusiveness of consent 
statutes that a bypass procedure that will suffice for a consent statute will 
suffice for a notice statute.  While the constitutional issue of whether a 
notice statute must contain a judicial bypass remains unresolved, North 
Dakota’s ACA contains such a bypass mechanism.244 
Closely related is the issue of whether creation of a judicial bypass is 
sufficient in itself to ensure the constitutionality of parental consent statutes.  
The Supreme Court of Alaska has held it is not.  The court concluded 
judicial bypass is not a sufficient safeguard to the minors’ privacy rights 
because the least restrictive alternative is parental notice with judicial 
bypass, not parental consent with judicial bypass.245  The court noted the 
Alaska Constitution’s privacy protections are greater than those afforded 
under the United States Constitution,246 holding although the state 
admittedly has a compelling interest in protecting minors by involving 
parents in such crucial decisions,247 the legislature had not chosen the least 
restrictive means.248 
The court explained the Alaska scheme provides parents a “veto 
power” over a minor’s abortion decisions, and the court’s review of statu-
tory schemes around the nation revealed a less restrictive alternative:  
parental notification.249  The court commented judicial bypass does not 
sufficiently “relieve [the minor] of the burden of parental consent,” noting 
“bypass procedures build in delay that may prove ‘detrimental to the 
physical health of the minor,’ particularly for minors in rural Alaska who 
 
243. Id. at 510 (“In analyzing this aspect of the dispute, we note that, although our cases have 
required bypass procedures for parental consent statutes, we have not decided whether parental 
notice statutes must contain such procedures.”). 
244. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-02.1 to -03.1 (2009). 
245. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 585 (Alaska 2007). 
246. Id. at 581 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22, concluding that “its protections [explic-
itly protecting privacy] are necessarily more robust and ‘broader in scope’ than those of the 
implied federal right to privacy”). 
247. Id. at 582 n.29. The court agreed the state’s interests were compelling, with the statute 
aiming to: “(1) ensure that minors make an informed decision on whether to terminate a preg-
nancy; (2) protect minors from their own immaturity; (3) protect minors’ physical and psycho-
logical health; (4) protect minors from sexual abuse; and (5) strengthen the parent-child relation-
ship.” Id. 
248. Id. at 583-85. 
249. Id. at 583. The court noted fifteen states have parental notification statutes that simply 
require parental notification, which is sufficient to allow parents to “actively involve themselves 
in their minor children’s decision-making processes . . . to consult with and guide their daughters 
through this important decision.” Id. at 583-84. 
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‘already face logistical obstacles to obtaining an abortion.’”250  According 
to the court, Alaska’s judicial bypass “will increase these problems, delay 
the abortion, and increase the probability that the minor may not be able to 
receive a safe and legal abortion.”251  Moreover, the court concluded, “the 
inclusion of this judicial bypass procedure does not reduce the restric-
tiveness of [the Act] relative to a parental notification statute,” noting every 
state to enact a parental notification statute did so in lieu of a consent 
statute—that is, the notice statutes also provide a form of a judicial bypass 
procedure.252  North Dakota courts are not likely to invalidate the State’s 
ACA on such grounds, in light of the fact North Dakota’s Constitution—
unlike the Alaska Constitution, but like the federal Constitution—does not 
contain an explicit guarantee of privacy. 
Finally, there remains the practical issue regarding the potential tension 
between medical ethics—the protection of patient confidentiality—and the 
law.  Therefore, while general ethical principles suggest physicians will 
normally encourage minors to involve their parents, N.D.C.C. section 14-
10-19(2) requires this discussion take place in the context of prenatal 
care.253  Considering North Dakota law and constitutional requirements, 
unless the patient agrees, a physician should not notify the parents that the 
minor patient has sought contraceptives or medical services related to her 
pregnancy.  In order to ensure both continuity of care and facial compliance 
with the legal requirements in the statute, physicians should establish a 
referral system so the care of the minor patient objecting to disclosure may 
be readily transferred to another physician.  Regarding abortion, North 
Dakota does not allow parental notification over a minor’s objection unless 
 
250. Id. at 584. 
251. Id. 
252. Id.  The court, holding the state failed to establish that the greater intrusiveness of the 
consent statute—than that of a notice statute—is necessary to advance its compelling interests, 
noted the state had not focused on the benefit of parental consent, but rather on the benefit of 
parental notice:  “[I]t has consistently suggested that [the Act’s] benefits flow from increased 
parental communication and involvement in the decision-making process.” Id.  The state elo-
quently stated this important interest: 
[The Act] protects minors from their own immaturity by increasing “adult super-
vision”; it protects the physical, emotional, and psychological health of minors, 
“[p]articularly in the post-abortion context, [by increasing] parental participation . . . 
for the purposes of monitoring . . . risks”; it ensures that minors give informed consent 
to the abortion procedure by making it more likely that they will receive “counsel that 
a doctor cannot give, advice, adapted to her unique family situation, that covers the 
moral, social and religious aspects of the abortion decision”; it protects minors from 
sexual abuse since “once appr[]ised of a young girl’s pregnancy, parents . . . will ask 
who impregnated her and will report any sexual abuse”; and it strengthens the parent-
child relationship by “increase[ing] parental involvement,” “parental consultation,” 
and open and honest communication. 
Id. 
253. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-19(1)(a) (2009). 
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the juvenile court finds the minor is not sufficiently mature and well-
informed to make her decision alone and that parental notice is in the 
minor’s best interest.254 
D. N.D.C.C. SECTION 14-10-19 DOES NOT RESOLVE THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES CONCERNING MINOR CONSENT FOR 
PRENATAL CARE 
Some providers believe North Dakota’s parental consent statutes may 
unconstitutionally interfere with the minor’s privacy rights.  North Dakota 
law, however, was susceptible to challenge on this ground prior to the 
Legislative Assembly’s enactment of N.D.C.C. section 14-10-19.  The stat-
ute does not alter parental consent requirements; it expands the circum-
stances under which a physician may provide care based on minor con-
sent.255  If a physician does not refer a minor patient after the first trimester, 
and one care visit during the second or third trimester, the statute requires 
parental notification.256  While the care limitation based on the minor’s own 
consent might conflict with the patient’s constitutional rights, current law 
already conditions treatment on parental notice; therefore, the constitutional 
issue exists without regard to the legislature’s enactment of N.D.C.C. sec-
tion 14-10-19.  Moreover, whether the Constitution requires a minor have 
an option to obtain a judicial bypass of parental notice requirements for 
prenatal care remains an open issue even after the enactment of N.D.C.C. 
section 14-10-19.  Finally, the statute authorizes a physician to notify 
parents “of any pregnancy care services given or needed if the physician . . . 
discusses with the minor the reasons for informing the parent . . .” if in the 
judgment of the physician the “failure to inform the parent . . . would 
seriously jeopardize the health of the minor of her unborn child; [s]urgery 
or hospitalization is needed; or [i]nforming the parent . . . would benefit the 
health of the minor or her unborn child.”257  This is consistent with regu-
lations under HIPAA, which preempts state law in circumstances where the 




255. Id. § 14-10-19. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(5)(i)(B) (2002). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
While medical practice is integrally entwined with ethics, economics, 
and the social and political lives of our society, the day-to-day care of 
patients weighs heavily on the physician in terms of time and attention.  
The medical profession is at the center of the health care industry, com-
manding research, educating students, directing other professionals, 
managing programs—such as the advancing Comparative Effectiveness 
regime259—running medical facilities, and caring for patients.  Physician 
decisions—overseen perhaps by insurance coverage—determine outcomes, 
costs, and patient satisfaction.  The demand on the practicing physician to 
shuffle paperwork260 is perhaps outweighed by the rewards, in which, tradi-
tionally, the physician-patient bond is valued and considered as sacrosanct 
as that between parishioner and priest.  Just as these basic facts are often 
overlooked in the hurly burly of daily life, so too the primary focus here is 
much narrower, attempting to show the competing interests when the 
patient is a minor who consults the physician about her pregnancy. 
Patients have an expectation of absolute trust and confidentiality.  
Were it not so, a patient may not fully disclose sensitive history, which 
could result in misdiagnosis and great harm to the patient.  Nurturing and 
protecting this bond is critical, but competing values come into play when 
the patient is a minor, where the normal assumption is that failure to 
involve the parents is potentially harmful to the minor patient.  This careful 
balancing act is most difficult in the case of the minor’s reproductive health, 
where the minor’s constitutional expectation of privacy is the greatest. 
Your experience with your fifteen-year-old patient has re-confirmed 
this:  your care, comfort, and compassion; your attention to her physical, 
mental, and emotional needs; and your inquiry and insight into her family 
dynamics calmed her and gave her optimism that she could broach the 
subject with her parents.  Not all experiences will be quite as successful in 
 
259. The Institute of Medicine of the National Academies issued a report entitled, Initial 
National Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research, on June 30, 2009.  See generally 
http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3809/63608/71025.aspx (indicating Comparative Effectiveness 
Research (CER) is “the generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and harms 
of alternative methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical condition or to improve 
the delivery of care.  The purpose of CER is to assist consumers, clinicians, purchasers, and policy 
makers to make informed decisions that will improve health care at both the individual and 
population levels”). Id. (emphasis omitted). 
260. Greater time spent on administrative tasks has been shown to be associated with low 
physician job satisfaction independent of compensation, financial incentives, and care manage-
ment restrictions.  See David Grembowski et al., Managed Care and Primary Physician Satisfac-
tion, 16 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRACT. 383, 383 (2003) (“Sources of physician dissatisfaction in-
clude loss of autonomy, increase in administrative burdens, potential loss of patients and income, 
greater time pressures, and threats of malpractice litigation.”). 
       
114 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:63 
this regard.  If another young woman is not convinced to speak with her 
family about her pregnancy, you must afford the confidentiality she de-
mands.  Nevertheless, you are satisfied your involvement has been positive; 
having provided her the treatment authorized by statute and having dis-
cussed with her the benefits of parental involvement.  You know that 
despite the limited nature of care available based on minor consent, your 
referral system to another caring physician accomplishes what you are able, 
fulfilling your legal and ethical obligations.  And you hope, as we all do, 
our society will do better by our youth—our very future—and through 
education and guidance, the incidence of teen pregnancy will fall. 
